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INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970s, the sudden economic leverage of the Arab boy-
cotting countries forced the United States to confront the successful as-
sertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction1 by foreign governments over
1. The term "jurisdiction" in the context of international political, legal, and economic
relations has a much broader meaning than that attributed to it in the domestic legal context.
See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (Revised) Part IV, Jurisdiction and Judgments,
Introductory Note, and § 401, Categories of Jurisdiction (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter
REVISED RESTATEMENT DRAFT]. The extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction discussed in
this Article generally consist of the use of economic leverage to induce certain behavior by
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American businesses. The United States responded to the problem by
enacting two antiboycott laws,2 driven by sovereign offense at the extra-
territorial impact of the Arab boycott as well as by concern for Israel.
This Article examines the Arab boycott's impact on the United
States and evaluates the nature and effectiveness of the United States
Congress' response ten years after the adoption of antiboycott laws. This
examination is framed in the context of the ongoing international debate
over standards for the extraterritorial application of politically motivated
trade laws.3 The Article suggests that the antiboycott laws have forced
the Arab states to significantly modify their boycott, bringing the boycott
closer in conformity with traditional views of a state's jurisdiction.
Although the laws provide reasonable, discernible boundaries for the im-
position of politically motivated economic trade restrictions, the United
States refusal to observe these standards in its own trade controls4 signifi-
cantly limits the credibility of both its antiboycott and trade control laws.
This Article adopts a four-part analysis of boycott participation by
American firms to review the boycott and Congressional response
thereto. The analysis focuses on the intrusiveness of the boycott, as mea-
sured by the nature of the participation sought from American compa-
nies in a particular transaction, and the degree of awareness of the
boycott required for compliance. The four factors considered in this
analysis are:
(1) The requirements of the boycott for routine or mechanical
manifestations of compliance;
(2) The requirements for participation in the administration and
enforcement of the boycott;
foreign parties. In the context of Part IV of the REVISED RESTATEMENT DRAFT'S treatment,
consideration of this asserted jurisdiction involves questions of a nation's "jurisdiction to pre-
scribe" certain behavior and its "jurisdiction to enforce" such prescriptions through economic
coercion, rather than through any form of traditional legal process.
2. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, tit. II, "Foreign Boycotts," Pub. L. No.
95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (codified as re-enacted at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403a (1986)); Tax Reform Act
of 1976, tit. X, pt. IV, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1649 (codified at I.R.C. § 999 (1986)).
3. The United States has been at the center of this debate because of its own politically
motivated trade controls. See infra notes 395-98 and accompanying text. In the revisions of
the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, the provisions dealing with asser-
tions of extraterritorial jurisdiction that encompassed United States trade controls have been
among the most controversial. In particular, § 403 "Limitation on Jurisdiction to Prescribe,"
and § 414 "Jurisdiction with Respect to Activities of Foreign Branches and Subsidiaries" de-
fined boundaries for United States jurisdiction that were met with criticism. See Rosenthal,
Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487, 489-92 (1985). See
generally Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or "There and Back Again," 25 VA. J.
INT'L L. 7 (1984) (detailed review of § 403 issues).
4. See infra notes 259-363 and accompanying text.
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(3) The demands to refuse trade with blacklisted concerns and to
discriminate against Jews; and
(4) The demands to refuse to trade with Israel.
After applying this analysis to the two antiboycott laws adopted in
1976 and 1977, this Article concludes that these statutes have not had a
measurable impact on the protection for Israel. The laws have, however,
been relatively successful in protecting United States sovereignty, which
has highlighted the controversy over the United States continuing incon-
sistent arguments for the extraterritorial application of its own political
trade controls. This controversy, because of the United States' broader
involvement with other Western nations, has caused the antiboycott laws
to be viewed as narrow pro-Israel, anti-Arab trade sanctions and has ob-
scured the validity of the general principles they reflect.
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A. Traditional View of International Economic Boycotts
Traditionally, economic boycotts have been described as either "pri-
mary" or "secondary." 5 This traditional description has been expanded
by observers of the Arab boycott to include a distinct tertiary level.6 The
distinctions among these three traditional categories are measured by the
remoteness of the behavior sought from the precipitating hostile relation-
ship between boycotting and boycotted countries.
A primary international economic boycott is one in which a country
forbids its nationals and residents to trade with another country and its
nationals or residents. For example, Arab states prohibit trade with
Israel, and the United States prohibits virtually all trade with Cuba, Viet-
nam, Kampuchea, and North Korea.'
5. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., THE ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERI-
CAN BUSINESS 1 (Subcommittee print 1976) [hereinafter ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS].
6. Id.; see also Joyner, The Transnational Boycott as Economic Coercion in International
Law: Policy, Place and Practice, 17 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 205, 216-18 (1984). Profes-
sor Joyner adds a fourth personal and religious component to his analysis. Cf Steiner, Inter-
national Boycotts and Domestic Order: American Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 54
TEX. L. REV. 1355, 1367-69 (1976). Professor Steiner analyzes the Arab Boycott as operating
at four levels: (1) core primary boycott, (2) extended primary boycott, (3) core secondary
boycott, and (4) extended secondary boycott. This extended secondary boycott relates to ac-
tivity which is frequently described as the tertiary boycott.
7. 15 C.F.R. § 385.1 (1985) (banning exports to those countries); 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201
(banning imports from Vietnam, North Korea, and Kampuchea), 505.10 (banning off-shore
transactions with, inter alia, Vietnam, North Korea, and Kampuchea) and 515.201 (banning
commercial transactions with Cuba) (1985). The United States system of boycotts involves a
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To maintain a secondary boycott, the boycotting country uses its
trading privileges as inducement to discourage or prevent third parties
from dealing with the target nation. Firms that trade with the target
nation are barred from trade with the boycotting country and its resi-
dents or nationals. Arab countries that participate in the secondary boy-
cott of Israel generate a blacklist of firms barred in those countries.
Similarly, the United States blacklists certain foreign firms because of
their dealings with communist countries. These blacklisted firms are
thus prevented from trading with American firms or individuals.8
The tertiary economic boycott can be considered a variation of the
secondary boycott, but it is useful, in the context of the Arab boycott, to
view such boycotts as a discrete category.9 The boycotting country ap-
plies tertiary pressure by using its trading privileges to induce others to
avoid trade with those enterprises that it has blacklisted. Firms that are
not connected to the target country may be barred for dealing with
blacklisted companies. The tertiary boycott places additional pressure
on blacklisted companies by denying them other potential business op-
portunities beyond those denied to them in the boycotting country. The
most aggressive Arab boycotting countries ban the import of goods from
"innocent" firms whose only connection is the inclusion of blacklisted
components in their goods."0
The legitimacy of the Arab boycott, or of any other set of politically
motivated international economic restrictions, is evaluated best as a ques-
tion of jurisdiction.1 Do the nations seeking to restrict trade with the
range of trade restrictions against countries, from virtual total bans on trade to minimal licens-
ing requirements. See generally A. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 5-
15 (2d ed. 1983) (general discussion of United States trade controls).
8. 15 C.F.R. § 388.3 (1985) provides for the denial of export privileges, including the
privilege exercised by foreign firms to purchase United States exports. 15 C.F.R. § 387.12
(1985) prohibits other persons subject to the law from dealing with those denied export
privileges.
9. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT TO Ac-
COMPANY S. 69 EXPORT ADMININSTRATION AMENDMENTS OF 1977, No. 104, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (1977) [hereinafter SENATE EAA REPORT 1977]; see also Steiner, supra note 4, at
1369.
10. See, e.g., ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERIcAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 41-42.
11. There are at least two other analytical approaches to the legitimacy of international
economic boycotts: a substantive international law approach and an economic approach. It is
difficult to separate the jurisdictional analysis and the substantive legal analysis because both
deal with the international acceptance of one nation's imposition of trade restrictions beyond
its borders. An affirmative determination of jurisdiction may still leave unanswered the legiti-
macy of the boycott under principles of international law. Similarly, an affirmative determina-
tion of the legality of a boycott is meaningless without the jurisdiction to implement it. The
jurisdictional examination provides a more realistic review of the relationships among nations
affected by a boycott effort, however. Acknowledgment of or acquiescence to a boycott by
1987]
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object of the boycott have a legitimate basis for the imposition of their
restrictions? In other words, do the boycotting nations have "jurisdic-
tion to prescribe"12 the economic relations of other persons or nations?
The proposed revision of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States suggests some of the recognized limita-
tions on such jurisdiction.13
The primary, secondary, and tertiary categories are jurisdiction-
based descriptions of international economic boycotts that implicitly rec-
ognize these limitations. At the primary level, the boycott is territorial in
scope, regulating the economic activity of those within the borders of the
boycotting country. Primary economic boycotts are almost universally
acknowledged as legitimate exercises of sovereign authority.14 Once the
boycott moves to the secondary level, and the boycotting country seeks
to induce those in third countries to refrain from trading with the target
of the boycott, the boycotting country has exceeded most of the com-
monly accepted notions of territorial jurisdiction.15 While the boycotting
other countries reflects those countries' view of the limits of the boycotting country's ability to
impose its restrictions, a view ofjurisdiction rather than a view of normative international law.
This question of ability to impose boycott restrictions ultimately merges into economic analysis
of international economic boycotts. The existence of a legal basis for a boycott is meaningless
to a nation without the economic leverage to make it effective. The economic analysis, how-
ever, is more oriented to the efficacy of boycotts rather than to their legitimacy. The question
of legitimacy, of course, ordinarily arises only when the economic ability to impose restrictions
exists at least to a limited extent. For a recent review of the status of international economic
boycotts in international law, see Joyner, supra note 6. Two widely recognized works treating
the economic question of international boycotts are D. LOSMAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: THE CASES OF CUBA, ISRAEL, AND RHODESIA (1979) and M. DOXEY, ECO-
NOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT (2nd ed. 1980).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 17, 18, 30 (1965). This is to be
distinguished from jurisdiction to enforce, § 20, which defines the ability of a country to imple-
ment its prescriptions. See REVISED RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 401 comment a
(discussion of distinctions among jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce).
13. REVISED RESTATEMENT DRAFT supra note 1, § 403. The standard adopted for the
limitation on this jurisdiction to prescribe is one of "reasonableness." The REVISED RESTATE-
MENT DRAFT incorporates the traditional jurisdictional standards of territoriality, territorial
effects, and nationality along with a number of other factors to be considered in determining
when exercises of jurisdiction to prescribe are reasonable. Where conflicts with assertions of
jurisdiction by another nation arise, the state with the superior interest, measured by these
factors, should prevail. See id.; cf. Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 488 (strong criticism of per-
ceived bias in favor of United States assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the approach
to reasonableness of earlier drafts of the REVISED RESTATEMENT).
14. See Joyner, supra note 6, at 229-30; SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 21.
15. The territorial basis for a nation's jurisdiction, as stated in draft 6 of the REVSED
RESTATEMENT, justifies regulation of "conduct a substantial part of which takes place within
its territory" and of "persons, or interests in things, present within its territory." REVISED
RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402 (1) (a) & (b). Neither category covers demands on
offshore third country nationals to refrain from trading with the target of the boycott.
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country may argue for its jurisdiction on the basis of the territorial effects
doctrine, 6 nationality (the principle argument offered by the United
States), 17 or the protective principle, 18 such assertions are not widely rec-
ognized in the context of economic boycotts. At the tertiary level, the
boycotting country's reach is even farther beyond these recognized inter-
national standards. 9
The drafters of the more comprehensive of the antiboycott laws, the
Export Administration Act (EAA)20 provision, claimed that the Act
treats the Arab boycott in terms of its primary, secondary, and tertiary
applications.2 1 The design was to permit American firms to participate
in the primary aspect of other nations' boycotts. For example, American
firms could agree not to ship Israeli goods to Arab countries, but not in
16. The REVISED RESTATEMENT describes activity outside a nation's borders "which has
or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory" as a basis for prescriptive jurisdic-
tion. REVISED RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402 (1)(c). The basis is somewhat
more controversial than a pure territorial justification. Id. § 402 comment d. The argument
that a transaction between an offshore, third country national and the object of a boycott will
have a substantial effect on the territory of the boycotting country, outside of perhaps muni-
tions and weaponry transactions, is tenuous at best.
17. REVISED RESTATEMENT DRAFT supra note 1, § 402 (2). "[A] state has jurisdiction
to prescribe law with respect to... (2) the activities, status, interests or relations of its nation-
als outside as well as within its territory .... " Id. § 402. The controversy arises over the
definition of "nationals," particularly with regard to foreign subsidiaries owned by companies
within the territory of the boycotting country. See Thompson, United States Jurisdiction over
Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 319,
363-99 (1983).
18. REVISED RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402 (3). "[A] state has jurisdiction
to prescribe law with respect to... (3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its
nationals which is directed against the security of the state or a limited class of other state
interests.... ." Id. § 402. The argument is founded in the security interests of the boycotting
state. Conduct reached under this basis, however, has not traditionally included trade by third
parties with a nation's enemies. Rather, it has applied to such things as espionage, counterfeit-
ing, and conspiracies to violate immigration laws. Id. § 402 comment f. See also Marcuss &
Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent
Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439,470-71,479-80 (1981) (discussing inapplicability of
the protective principle to United States trade controls).
19. The remoteness of the party over which jurisdiction is sought to be exercised from
both the boycotting country and the target country eliminates even colorable claims to territo-
rial effects, nationality, or protective principles of jurisdiction. See supra notes 15-18 and ac-
companying text.
20. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1986).
21. SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 20-31. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS, REPORT ON H.R. 5840 TO AMEND THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AcT
OF 1969 IN ORDER TO EXTEND THE AUTHORITIES OF THAT AcT AND IMPROVE THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF EXPORT CONTROLS UNDER THAT ACT, AND TO STRENGTHEN THE AN-
TIBOYCOTT PROVISIONS OF THAT AcT, No. 190, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 4-6 (1977) [hereinafter
HOUSE EAA REPORT 1977].
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the secondary or tertiary aspects. 22 The actual impact of the boycott and
the effect of the antiboycott laws, however, is more complex than the
three-tier analysis can satisfactorily describe.
Although this Article again will return to the three-part characteri-
zation and the attendant questions of jurisdiction, it adopts, for purposes
of analysis, a four-level range that is more directly related to the actual
transactions affected by the operation of the Arab boycott and to the
degree of cognizance the participating foreign firms must take of the boy-
cott. Such a transactional awareness approach is more effective in mea-
suring the successes and shortcomings of the antiboycott laws, because
the statutes were a response to tangible instances of interference rather
than a theoretical response to the conceptual impact of primary, secon-
dary, and tertiary boycotts. 23
B. The Four Levels of Boycott Participation
The Arab boycott permeates the entire spectrum of commercial re-
lationships with the boycotting countries. To understand the boycott, it
is necessary to divide the impact of the boycott into four categories on a
continuum, beginning with the most routine, largely documentary and
symbolic requirements and moving to the fundamental demands to cease
all trade with Israel. For purposes of this discussion, the four categories
are described as:
(1) Required manifestations of participation in the boycott;
(2) Participation in enforcement and administration of the
boycott;
(3) Discrimination against real and corporate persons; and
(4) Discrimination against Israel.24
1. Required Manifestations of Participation in the Boycott
At their most pervasive, yet most superficial level of application, the
Arab boycott rules require those trading with the boycotting countries to
document their participation in the boycott by providing statements to
that effect on their commercial and shipping documents.25 These re-
quirements are commonly imposed in customs regulations or incorpo-
rated as conditions in documentary letters of credit. As Table 1
22. SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 21. HOUSE EAA REPORT 1977, supra
note 21, at 5.
23. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 20-27.
24. Table 1 demonstrates how these categories relate to the more traditional three-part
analysis of the Arab boycott.
25. See ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 32-39.
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indicates, these requirements transcend all three traditional boycott
levels. Thus, these requirements involve primary boycott certification
that the goods are not products of Israel, secondary boycott certification
that the seller or purchaser is not blacklisted, and tertiary boycott certifi-
cation that the goods are not manufactured by blacklisted concerns.
These requirements are largely symbolic at all three levels. While
they may serve some enforcement function,26 the requirements appear to
be primarily precautionary reminders serving as international advertise-
ments of participation in the boycott.27 Today, these statements are in-
corporated into the shipping or financing documentation, and for this
reason the providing of the statements has been routinized as largely
mechanical actions performed at a clerical level by participating Ameri-
can firms.28
The requirements have, in fact, become so routine that they are im-
posed regardless of the apparent impossibility of a person acting contrary
to the boycott rules. For example, most of the boycotting countries re-
quire a certification that goods shipped to an Arab country are not
shipped on an Israeli vessel or any other blacklisted vessel.29 Other boy-
cott enforcement procedures assure that such vessels do not regularly call
at Arab ports.30 Thus, firms exporting to the Arab Middle East have
virtually no opportunity to ship on Israeli or blacklisted vessels. None-
26. Arab customs officials would automatically exclude shipments with contrary certifica-
tions, but these requirements are relatively well-known through commercial trade documenta-
tion publications. Conceivably firms unfamiliar with the Arab boycott could be alerted to it by
the requirement for such certifications. These requirements could cause a firm to avoid an
Israeli product (Israeli service providers such as carriers or insurers do not operate in the Arab
world), but they are unlikely to affect selection of blacklisted goods. The various blacklists are
not well-publicized and requests for certifications of blacklist status are more likely to result in
certifications than inquiries to supplying firms about their status.
27. The United States Senate viewed such requirements as a potential "psychological bar-
rier to trade with the boycotted country or blacklisted firms .... SENATE EAA REPORT 1977,
supra note 9, at 24.
28. The continuation of the documentary requirements is particularly apparent in the em-
phasis the Commerce Department placed on companies training lower-level employees to
screen trade documentation for these requirements. These corporate compliance programs
were mandated by Commerce pursuant to consent agreements for alleged violations. See, eg.,
In re Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3414, 3416 (1981). "Cam-
eron shall review Sales Order Processing Procedures and instruct the Legal Department to
educate the Sales Order Processing and Billing Departments as to the importance of following
the designated procedures with respect to taking appropriate exception to requests for negative
certifications on transactions .. ." Id.
29. ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 33, 34 (shipping clauses
were indicated in over 50% of the transactions surveyed by the committee for 1974 and 1975).
30. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at DS-365.
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theless, the documentary requirements are imposed.31
2. Participation in Enforcement and Administration of the
Boycott
The second level on which the boycott operates is the requirement
that firms trading with Arab nations assist in administering and enforc-
ing the boycott. This works in three different ways: (1) companies are
asked to enter into agreements to participate in the boycott, particularly
agreements to discriminate against targets of the boycott; (2) companies
are asked to provide information about their business relationships and
the relationships of others with targets of the boycott to enable the boy-
cotting countries to learn who is dealing with Israel and with blacklisted
firms; and (3) foreign banks which advise, confirm, or pay letters of credit
issued by boycotting country banks are asked to enforce the boycott
terms or conditions in the letters of credit.32
As with the first category of manifested participation, this second
classification involves all three traditional boycott tiers. The boycotting
countries seek agreements from the firms to refuse to import Israeli
goods into the Arab country (primary boycott), agreements not to trade
at all with Israel (secondary), or agreements not to trade with blacklisted
firms or import blacklisted goods (tertiary).
The greater cognizance the subjected firms must take of the boycott
demands distinguishes the second level from the first. The demands
reach a much higher level in the corporate hierarchy because contracts
will be reviewed and approved at a substantially higher level within a
company than demands for shipping certificates and will require greater
effort or attention to be complied with. Similarly, boycott questionnaires
attached to such transactions, or required for registration to conduct
business in a country, will receive attention much higher in the corporate
chain than requirements for statements to be placed on the invoices.
In most instances, however, the demands at the corporate level still
do not ask for any actions that would directly harm another real or cor-
porate person, or that would affect Israel. The demands for agreements
to refuse to trade or to enforce restrictions in letters of credit, are require-
ments of specific transactions and are generally precautionary in their
effect. Most firms, to comply with such demands, do not have to change
any trading relationships or actually refuse to do business with anyone.
They respond to the requirements as formalities. To the extent that the
31. See ARAB BOYCOrr AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 33.
32. SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 26.
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boycott requirements demand discrimination or actual refusals to do
business, this analysis places their impact in one of the next two
categories.
3. Discrimination Against Real and Corporate Persons
At both the third and fourth levels of participation, the boycott rules
demand conscious action by the participating firm to deny a commercial
opportunity to a target of the boycott. The third level roughly coincides
with the traditional view of the tertiary boycott. The Arab boycott re-
quirements demand that foreign firms sever or avoid commercial ties
with blacklisted firms and with Jews. This religious aspect is unique to
the Arab boycott and its impact is a matter of some disagreement.33
Notwithstanding the motivation, religious discrimination requires the
same level of cognizance as does economic discrimination against black-
listed firms. Foreign companies are requested or required, as a condition
of doing business with the Arab boycotting countries, to discriminate
against those identified by the Arab states as friends or supporters of
Israel. What distinguishes this level of involvement from the fourth step,
discrimination against Israel, is the generally narrower scope of the de-
manded discrimination. In most instances these demands are limited to
the specific dealings that the foreign company has with the Arab boycott-
ing state. The demand not to deal with the blacklisted firm thus is lim-
ited to the transaction the foreign firm plans to engage in with the Arab
country. These requirements involve requests to change trading or hir-
ing patterns. Usually, however, these requirements pertain only to a spe-
cific transaction with the Arab state.
4. Discrimination Against Israel
The fourth level of this analysis reflects the most far-reaching de-
mand of the boycott on a foreign firm. In order to trade with the boy-
cotting country, the foreign firm is generally required not to trade with
Israel.34 According to traditional analysis, this is a secondary boycott
demand.35 It is, however, the aspect of the boycott calling for the great-
est level of cognizance of and participation in the boycott by the foreign
firm. The Arab states are concerned not only with Israeli contacts affect-
ing the transaction a foreign firm may have with an Arab state, but, in-
33. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
34. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 20; see also A. LOWENFELD, supra
note 7, at DS-344-DS-347 (General Principles for the Boycott of Israel, para. 15, Foreign com-
panies and institutes acting in support of the economy of Israel).
35. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 20.
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deed, with any contact the foreign firm may have with Israel. In essence,
the firms are being given a choice: trade with the Arab states or trade
with Israel. Because of the economic leverage suddenly available to the
Arab states after the oil price rise, this choice was transformed from an
economic option to coercion.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT
A. The Pre-Oil Embargo Boycott
The origins of the Arab boycott of Israel are firmly rooted in the
historic conflict over the creation of a Jewish state in traditional Pales-
tine. Economic coercion against Jewish settlers in Palestine dates back to
the 1920s, when Arab groups called for boycotts of Jewish businesses.36
With the emergence of autonomous Arab states following the second
World War and the beginnings of organized cooperative efforts by those
states, economic pressure against the Jews in Palestine became a central
part of the effort to block the formation of a Jewish state.37 In 1945,
when the Arab League (League) was formed, one of the first resolutions
adopted called for a boycott of "Zionist goods."38 In 1946 the League
established a permanent Boycott Committee, and later that year the
League adopted a set of procedural recommendations for its members.39
This development marked the beginning of the formal framework for the
boycott.40
These recommendations called upon each member state to establish
a boycott office for the purpose of administering the economic boycott.
41
The League also recommended a ban on exports to Palestine of raw
materials that could be used in the manufacture of goods for resale, along
with a ban on doing business with "Zionist" service industries.42 At this
early stage, the League recognized the difficulties of administering the
boycott. Thus, to facilitate the ban on "Zionist" goods, the League rec-
ommended the establishment of procedures to determine the origin of
goods imported into the Arab countries.43
36. K. TESLIK, CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND SPECIAL INTERESTS: THE
AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE ARAB BoYcoTr OF ISRAEL 7 (1982). See also A.
LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at 309-10.
37. K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 7.
38. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at 310.
39. K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 7.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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In the early 1950s, the Arab League Council (Council) expanded the
boycott beyond the territories of its member states, banning trade with
third parties that dealt in some fashion with Israel.' In 1950, the Coun-
cil recommended that vessels carrying military cargo to Israel be black-
listed. This was the first time such action had been recommended against
non-Zionists." In 1951, the Council created the Central Office of the
Boycott of Israel to coordinate the expanding boycott. This office was
located in Damascus, Syria.4 6 The following year, the Council signifi-
cantly expanded the extraterritorial aspect of its boycott by recom-
mending that members of the Arab League ban trade with those foreign
companies that established offices or branches in Israel. 7 Two years
later, the Council incorporated this recommendation into a "Unified Law
of the Boycott of Israel."" The law banned trading of any kind with
Israel as well as with those firms having branches or general agencies
within Israel.4 9 This model law was ultimately adopted by each member
of the League without significant changes.50
B. The Role of American Firms
As the Arab boycott took on extraterritorial characteristics, it began
to have some impact on American firms trading in the region. As early
as 1960, the United States Congress expressed its opposition to the boy-
cott. 1 When the Arab boycott became a substantial issue before the
Congress in 1965,52 the role of American firms was the primary focus of
concern.
Level-one and level-two boycott participation by American firms re-
ceived most of the Congressional attention. Several witnesses testified
before congressional committees in efforts to coerce elimination of trade
with Israel (level-four participation).53 Nonetheless, the majority of the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The office remains there today.
47. Id.
48. Reprinted as adopted by Saudi Arabia in 1962 in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 9, at
DS-394.
49. K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 8.
50. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at 314.
51. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
53. Continuation ofAuthority for Regulation of Exports and Amending the Export Control
Act of 1949: Hearings on H.R. 7105, H.R. 627 and H.R. 4361 Before the Comm. on Banking
and Currency and the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (testimony of Sen. Javits), 199 (testimony of Irving Jay Fain,
American-Israel Public Affairs Committee) (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings].
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comments centered on Arab requirements that American firms manifest
their compliance with the boycott through non-Israeli origin certifica-
tions (level-one), and, moreover, that they assist in enforcement through
responses to questionnaires about their trade relations with Israel (level-
two). 4 Similarly, while some concern was expressed about possible de-
mands for religious discrimination (level-three participation), the re-
quests for information about religion (level-two) excited more interest.55
In 1965, Congress considered imposing a ban on the furnishing of boy-
cott-related information to the Arab states.56 However, it ultimately de-
clined to deal directly with any aspect of the boycott problem and settled
on a simple reporting requirement.
5 1
The boycott reports received by the Commerce Department under
the 1965 law consisted overwhelmingly of requests for non-Israeli certifi-
cates for export shipments5" or similar certifications that the insurance
company was not blacklisted. 9 While there were some reports of boy-
cott certificate demands in letters of credit60 and some boycott question-
naires reported,6" level-one demands for participation predominated.
Congressional testimony indicated that requests for religious information
or discriminatory conduct were made.62 Reported instances of boycott
influence during the early 1970s, however, were almost exclusively lim-
ited to documentary certifications and requests for information.63
C. Detailed Boycott Rules
In 1972, the Central Office of the Boycott of Israel promulgated reg-
ulations entitled "General Principles for the Boycott of Israel."'  These
regulations provided detailed rules and procedures governing the admin-
istration of the boycott, including the mode of incorporation of periodic
54. Id. at 31 (statement of Rep. Roosevelt).
55. ARAB BoYcoTr AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 13. See also K. TESLIK,
supra note 36, at 55-57.
56. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
58. BUREAU OF EAST-WEST TRADE, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AD-
MINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 111TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 18
(lst quarter 1975) [hereinafter 11 TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 19.
62. See infra note 98, 102.
63. See 111TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 18.
64. Reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at DS-333. The Principles are a collection
of topically arranged decisions and interpretations concerning the boycott arrived at by the
Arab League over its years of enforcement.
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resolutions of the Council's updated rules. The scope of this document
demonstrates how comprehensive the boycott had grown, in principle if
not in practice,65 in the twenty years since it began, as well as how far it
had moved from its initial exclusive focus on Israel. The provisions re-
flect the efforts of the boycotting countries to engage the participation of
American firms at the four different levels of boycott participation.
The routine, documentary requirements for certifications of boycott
participation are enunciated in detail in the General Principles. These
level-one conditions include certificates of destination for exports,66 cer-
tificates of origination for imports,67shipping certificates, 68 and insurance
certificates.69
Level-two requirements for participation in administration and en-
forcement of the boycott appear expressly in the provisions for imposing
and lifting bans on foreign companies which require information about
their dealings with Israel.7 The Arab states have incorporated the rules
reflected in the General Principles into questionnaires71 that ask for
agreements to such terms72 or place them as conditions in letters of
credit.73
The General Principles provide rules designed to coerce foreign
firms into the third level of boycott participation, that is, refusal to trade
with blacklisted concerns or other targets identified as supporting the
principal boycotted country. These rules describe the maximum amount
65. In operation, the boycott has never been as rational or as predictable as its written
rules or procedures indicate. Because each country is autonomous in its administration of the
boycott, the levels of enforcement vary widely. In addition, the political and financial stakes
involved in boycott and blacklisting decisions are so great that reports and rumors of the use of
influence and corruption abound. See K. TESLIK, supra note 39, at 11-13.
66. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 9, at DS-335.
67. Id. at DS-336.
68. Id. at DS-337 to DS-340.
69. Id. at DS-379.
70. See, e.g., id. at DS-352. The authorities in the Arab countries have a duty, when any
foreign company or institution operating in the services sector submits a request, to establish a
similar undertaking in one of the Arab countries, not to permit it to do so until they have
received from it a verified statement that it does not have any connection with Israel that
contravenes the principles of the boycott. In addition, the authorities should receive from the
foreign entity an assurance that its owners or director are not engaged in any activity in sup-
port of Israel or Zionism. Id.
71. ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 32, 88.
72. See, e.g., OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINIS-
TRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT FY 1980
82 (Table 7-2 listing categories of reported boycott terms demanded by Arab nations), 84
(Table 7-4 listing types of documents containing the boycott demands) [hereinafter EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1980].
73. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 9, at 317.
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that a firm may deal with a banned company before the firm itself be-
comes banned.74 The rules include only one express religious reference
in their restrictions.75 They do include, however, references to "Zion-
ism" and "Zionists,"76 terms that the Arab boycott authorities claim are
not religious in their usage."
Most of the requirements, however, relate to the fourth level of boy-
cott participation-the ban on trading with Israel. The rules establish
criteria for blacklisting firms for trade with Israel across a wide range of
industries. Separate sections deal with, inter alia, banks,78 insurance
companies," oil companies,"° airlines,81 hotels, 82 and "Moving-Picture
Companies, Actors and Films."83 The nature and detail of these rules
reflect the boycotting countries' tolerance for only the most minimal con-
tacts with Israel, as well as their awareness of the practical difficulties of
imposing the ban.
By 1973, when the increases in oil prices occurred and the economic
power of the Arab boycotting countries increased geometrically, an es-
tablished boycott apparatus was in place. This facilitated the signifi-
74. Id. at DS-347 ("Second: Participation in Projects with Banned Companies") and DS-
349 to DS-350 ("Third: Special Rules (1) Licenses of Banned Companies; (2) Use of Products
of Banned Companies; (3) Technical Assistance Agreements with Banned Companies").
75. Id. at DS-341 ("Measures to be taken against persons who have been determined to be
agents of Israel or concerning whom there are indications that they are agents of Israel:
.. C. Prohibition of Jews who have been deprived of the citizenship of one Arab state to
enter the territory of or reside in another Arab state. .. ").
76. Id. at DS-357 ("Ninth: Natural Persons Having Zionist Sympathies") and DS-361
("Eleventh: Legal Persons Having Zionist Tendencies").
77. The Boycott Principles are also very far from racial or religious influences; it is
practiced with all persons-natural or moral-notwithstanding their nationality or
religion, as long as they support the economy of Israel and its war effort. In this
respect, the Boycott Authorities do not discriminate among persons on the basis of
their religion or nationality, they do so rather on the basis of their partiality or im-
partiality to Israel and Zionism. Nothing can prove that more than the fact the Arab
states deal with companies that are owned by Jews who are not biased in Israel's
favour and did nothing that supports its economy or strengthen its military effort;
while, on the other hand, Arab states have banned dealings with foreign companies
and firms owned by Moslems or Christians, because such companies have done
things which have supported the economy of Israel or its military effort.
Nature of the Arab Boycott of Israel (statement of Mohammed Mahmoud Mahgoub, Commis-
sioner General of the Arab Boycott of Israel (1975)), reprinted in ARAB BOYCOTr AND AMER-
ICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 86.
78. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at DS-340 ("Surveillance of Financial Houses") and
DS-371 ('Foreign Banks Dealing with Israel").
79. Id. at DS-379.
80. Id. at DS-370.
81. Id. at DS-372.
82. Id. at DS-352.
83. Id. at DS-374.
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cantly increased intrusion of the Arab boycott at all four levels into
American economic life throughout the middle of the 1970s.
D. Increased Impact of the Boycott
Between October and December of 1973, the price of a barrel of
Saudi Arabian light crude oil increased from $3.01 to $11.65.84 During
the same period, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab members of the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an em-
bargo on the shipment of oil to the United States in response to the
United States shipments of military equipment to Israel during the height
of the Yom Kippur war." These two developments radically altered the
impact of the Arab boycott on the United States. The price increase cre-
ated an astonishing and immediate transfer of wealth to Arab oil export-
ing countries,86 giving them the economic leverage to make their boycott
effective. The oil embargo fueled a negative image of the Arabs' use of
their newly discovered leverage and helped to trigger the adoption of new
antiboycott laws by the United States. 7
A review of the trade figures between the United States and the prin-
cipal Arab boycotting countries provides some indication of the in-
creased impact the boycott had on the United States and on American
business.8 8 In 1973, the United States exported approximately $1.3 bil-
lion of goods and services to those fourteen countries, and imported ma-
terial worth slightly less than $1 billion.8 9 By 1976, when political
concern over the impact of the boycott was at its peak, United States
exports to those countries had grown to $6.1 billion, while imports had
increased to $11.3 billion.9"
This increased trade translated into increased boycott activity as
84. M. FIELD, A HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS A DAY: INSIDE THE WORLD OF MID-
DLE EAST MONEY 9-15 (1975).
85. Id.; see also S. EMERSON, THE AMERICAN HOUSE OF SAUD: THE SECRET PE-
TRODOLLAR CONNECTION 36-40 (1985).
86. M. FIELD, supra note 84. The current account surplus of OPEC increased from $2.6
billion in 1972 to $70 billion in 1974. Askari, The International Trade Implications of the Oil
Cartel, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 47 (1977).
87. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 68-70.
88. The following comprises the list of boycotting countries maintained by the Treasury
Department: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, Peoples Democratic Republic of
Yemen. I.R.C. § 999(a)(3) (1985). Egypt was dropped after the Camp David Agreement, 45
Fed. Reg. 23465 (1980).
89. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE YEARBOOK 378-79
(1980) [hereinafter IMF, 1980 YEARBOOK].
90. Id.
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well. In 1974,9' only twenty-three American firms reported to the De-
partment of Commerce that they had received boycott related requests.92
In 1976, over 2,200 firms filed such reports.93 In 1974, the twenty-three
firms reported that only 785 transactions with the Arab boycotting coun-
tries involved boycott requests,94 while in 1976 the 2,200 firms reported
over 97,000 transactions with boycott conditions or requirements.95
As a result of the boycott's increased effect on American business, in
1975 and 1976 Congress held numerous hearings concerning the opera-
tion of the boycott. 96 These hearings, and the reports that they gener-
ated, focused on the experiences of various American firms in responding
to Arab boycott pressure. Relying to a great extent on anecdotal mate-
rial,9 7 Congress probed participation by American firms at all four levels
of involvement.
Data collected by the Commerce Department vividly demonstrates
the enhanced scope of the boycott's impact on United States business
91. While the income available to the boycotting countries was substantially increased by
1974, there is some evidence that these countries were consciously restraining their boycott
enforcement activity during most of the year. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 69.
92. 111TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 17.
93. BUREAU OF EAST-WEST TRADE, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AD-
MINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 114TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 14
(Apr.-Sept. 1976) [hereinafter 114TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT]. (The Commerce
Department issued Export Administration Reports quarterly from 1949 through the first quar-
ter of 1975, 1st through 111th Reports, and semiannually from the fiscal years 1975 through
1979, 112th through 120th Reports, and annually thereafter.) The number of reporting parties
in the first half of fiscal year 1976 was 1,264, BUREAU OF EAsT-WEST TRADE, DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 113TH EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION REPORT 14 (Oct. 1975-Mar. 1976) [hereinafter 113TH EXPORT ADMINIS-
TRATION REPORT]. Because, in compiling the statistics, each six month period was treated
separately, it is impossible to determine the total of reporting parties for the year. Most of
those reporting in one period probably also reported in the other period as well. The figure
quoted for 1976 is the total for the second half of the fiscal year, the higher of the two periods.
94. 111TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 17.
95. 113TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 93, at 14 (24,710 transactions
from Oct. 1975-Mar. 1976) 114TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 93, at 14
(72,781 transactions from Apr. 1976-Sept. 1976). There is no duplication in reported transac-
tions between the two periods, so a total annual figure is valid.
96. See Mersky & Richard, Legal Implications of the Arab Economic Boycott of the State
of Israel: A Research Guide, 71 L. LIB. J. 72-73 (1978).
97. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, EXPORT ADMIN-
ISTRATION AMENDMENTS, FOREIGN BOYCOTTS, AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT IMPROVED DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1976, S. REP. No. 917, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)
15-18 [hereinafter SENATE EAA REPORT 1976]; ARAB BOYCOTr AND AMERICAN BUSINESS,
supra note 5, at 37-45. See generally Discriminatory Arab Pressure on U S. Business: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Trade and Commerce of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) [hereinafter Discriminatory Arab Pressure].
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transactions.9" Table 2 shows the increase in several significant catego-
ries of boycott requests.
Particularly noteworthy are the increased boycott demands reported
in letters of credit (from 1,900 to 42,000 in 1976 alone), the demands for
non-Israeli origin statements (from 742 to over 70,000 for the same pe-
riod), and increases in boycott questionnaires.
The increased reports of boycott participation cannot be solely at-
tributed to increased boycott demands. At least three other factors con-
tributed to these dramatic increases: (1) Reporting rule changes made by
the Commerce Department in 1975;99 (2) the heightened awareness of
the boycott due to Commerce Department actions" ° and heightened
press coverage; and (3) increased trade with the Arab boycotting
states.101
The reported demands, although only for the lowest two levels of
boycott participation, reflect an extraordinary foreign effort to influence
United States commercial practices. They also help to explain the signifi-
cant legislative steps which Congress took in late 1976 and 1977.
98. Serious questions were raised by Congress about the accuracy and completeness of the
Commerce Department data for the period prior to 1976. See ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERI-
CAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 23-29. These questions related to, inter alia, the accuracy of
the details included in the reports and the indications of compliance with the requests. While
some concern was expressed over apparent underreporting, the figures for 1974 and 1975 still
provide a reference point for comparison. While the reports filed through 1976 only reflect
requests for level-one and level-two participation in the boycott, the changes occurring from
1974 to 1976 help explain the heightened concern of the Congress.
99. Commerce rules had only required exporters to report boycott requests prior to No-
vember 1975. At that time the rules were amended to require reports from exporters and
related service organizations, defined to include inter alia banks, insurers, freight forwarders
and shipping companies. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 (1976). See Statement by the President announc-
ing a series of Administrative Actions and Legislative Proposals to Provide a Comprehensive
Response to Discrimination Against Americans, 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1305 (Nov.
20, 1975) [hereinafter President Ford Statement]. The effect of this change was to render the
Commerce Department reporting totals misleading in some respects. A given export sale
might now generate a report by the exporter, bank, and freight forwarder. If each party re-
ported the total value of the sale, totals for dollar value of boycott transactions would be
misleading. However, the total number of transactions would be more accurate since each part
of the sale can be viewed as a separate transaction for the reporting party (that is, the exporter
reports the sale, the bank reports processing the letter of credit, the freight forwarder reports
handing the shipment, etc.).
100. In mid-1975 the Commerce Department sent copies of the boycott regulations to
30,500 firms listed in the American International Traders Register. 111THI EXPORT ADMINIS-
TRATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 17. Late in 1975 a copy of the revised regulations was
sent to every exporter that had filed a report with the department since 1972, and to 2,965
banks, insurers, forwarders, and shippers. 113TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra
note 93, at 10.
101. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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III. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
A. First Treatment: 1965
Congressional concern over the Arab boycott arose in the late
1950s,' 2 and was first given statutory expression in the 1960 Douglass-
Hays Amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1954.1°3 The Amend-
ment instructed the President to administer aid under the Act in a fash-
ion that would give effect to Congress' objection to nations engaging in
"economic warfare" against each other, "including such procedures as
boycotts."'" Even this nebulous stand by Congress generated contro-
versy, indicating early concern over offending the Arab boycotting states
through affirmative steps directed toward the boycott."15
In 1965 the Congress again considered the Arab boycott, this time
in the context of amendments to the Export Control Act of 1949.116 The
House of Representatives conducted hearings which considered primar-
ily the demands at levels one and two on American firms for participa-
tion in the administration or enforcement of the Arab boycott. 10 7 While
some concerns were expressed over potential religious discrimination, the
two major considerations of the 1965 legislation were (1) the boycott's
impact on Israel and (2) the offense to United States sovereignty
presented by the Arab boycott demands on United States business.'
Ten years later, these themes would reappear greatly magnified.
An unsuccessful effort was made both in the House and the Senate
to add general language that prohibited all participation of American
firms in the boycott.'0 9 A compromise to the total ban sought to prohibit
the furnishing of information by American firms in response to boycott
demands." 0 This too was defeated. While the Johnson Administration
ultimately supported a general statement opposing the participation of
102. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 53-54.
103. Mutual Security Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-472, 74 Stat. 134 (amending the Mutual
Security Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1750-1753a), repealed by Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-195, Ch. 3, 75 Stat. 460.
104. Mutual Security Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-472, § 2, 74 Stat. 134.
105. K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at § 4.
106. 1965 Amendments to the Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 89-63, 79 Stat.
209, (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1966), current version, Export Administration
Act of 1979, at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2403 (1986)).
107. See supra Table Number 1 and text accompanying notes 26-30.
108. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 29-31 (statement of Rep. Roosevelt). See
also K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 56.
109. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 57-58.
110. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 36 (text of H.R. 627 and H.R. 4361). See K.
TESLIK, supra note 36, at 55-56.
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American firms in foreign economic boycotts, its representatives opposed
any mandatory prohibitions.1 I
One of the primary objections raised by the Johnson Administration
in 1965 presaged the dilemma created by the adoption of strict an-
tiboycott laws ten years later-the impact of mandatory anti-boycott lan-
guage on the United States' own trade controls and embargoes. The
administration pointed out that it was inconsistent for the United States
to take steps to block other nations from imposing the kind of economic
sanctions that the United States itself sought to impose.11 2 The United
States economic sanctions against Cuba were cited as the prime example
of a United States effort to enlist the participation of other nations in a
boycott that might be undermined by United States action against a simi-
lar effort by the Arabs.113
As a compromise, Congress in 1965 adopted a policy statement that
the United States opposed economic boycotts against nations with which
it maintains friendly relations and encouraged American firms not to
participate in such boycotts.1 1 4 The statement called upon the Secretary
of Commerce to require American exporters to file reports with the Com-
merce Department of any requests to participate in the Arab boycott.11
Athough Congress rejected a direct bar on participation of American
firms in the Arab boycott (and other potential boycotts considered by
Congress at the time),1 6 the Congress and President went on record as
being opposed to the Arab boycott. A foundation for the adoption of
stronger measures then existed in the mid-1970s when the influence of
that boycott on American business suddenly expanded.
B. The Government Response: 1975-1977
Nineteen seventy-five marked the start of a three-year barrage of
111. See ARAB BoYcoTr AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 12-14 (discussion of
Johnson Administration role in 1965 legislation).
112. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 61 (statement of Acting Secretary of State
George Ball).
113. Id. at 38 (letter to committee chairman from Assistant Secretary of State Douglas
MacArthur II).
114. Amendment to Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 3(a), 79 Stat. 209
(1965).
115. Amendment to Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 4(d), 79 Stat. 209-10
(1965). See Lowenfeld, ': . . Sauce for the Gander" The Arab Boycott and United States
Political Trade Controls, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 25, 34-36 (1977) (discussion of the implementing
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce and the difficulty in differentiating
between the opposed Arab boycott and United States-fostered Cuban boycott).
116. Other potential boycotts affected at the time were Indonesia-Malaysia, Ethiopia-
Somalia and Iran-Bahrein. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 28.
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state and federal actions aimed at controlling the participation of Ameri-
can firms in the Arab boycott. During 1975 and 1976 there were several
extended Congressional investigations concerning the impact of the boy-
cott as well as the adequacy of the United States response.' 1 7 This time
Congress focused on all four levels of boycott participation by American
firms.
The proliferation of demands for level-one manifestations of partici-
pation in the form of non-Israeli origin certificates and non-blacklist sup-
plier/insurer/carrier certificates received substantial attention,I" just as
they had in 1965. Similarly, level-two demands for questionnaires and
religious information also received attention." 9 In addition, however,
the following two new aspects of level-two participation were examined:
(1) the increased role of American banks in enforcing boycott terms in
letters of credit;12 and (2) the increased demands accompanying transac-
tions with agreements not to deal with Israel or with blacklisted firms. 121
Level-three demands to terminate or avoid trade with blacklisted con-
cerns (as opposed to simple agreements not to trade) became a major new
element in the discussion. 122 This was, in part, the result of a huge in-
crease in the number of American firms appearing on the blacklist be-
tween 1965 and 1975.123 Concerns over religious discrimination against
United States citizens received greater attention as a result of new evi-
dence of actual discrimination, 2 4 as contrasted with evidence of the mere
potential for such discrimination, as perceived in 1965.125 Level-four
boycott participation by American firms in refusing to trade with Israel
re-emerged as a focal point in congressional considerations. 26
117. See Mersky and Richard, supra note 96; see generally K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 82-
87.
118. See ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 32-37.
119. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 25.
120. See generally Effectiveness of Federal Agencies' Enforcement of Laws and Policies
aqainst Compliance, by Banks and other U.S. Firms, with the Arab Boycott: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Governments Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-42 (1976)
(Part I) (examination of bank responses to boycott terms in letters of credit) [hereinafter Effec-
tiveness of Federal Enforcement Hearings (Part 1)].
121. See ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 9, at 32-33.
122. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 16-18.
123. There were only 164 American firms reported on the Arab blacklist in 1965. 122
CONG. REC. S 14840 (daily ed. June 30, 1965) (statement of Sen. Javits). Compare this to the
approximately 1,500 listed by 1975. ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5,
at 37.
124. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 78-80, 110-11. See generally Discriminatory Arab
Pressure, supra note 97.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
126. See 122 CONG. REC. S 17461 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976) (statement of Sen. Stevenson)
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While the range of participation by American firms in the boycott
was relatively broad, and congressional scrutiny of it was varied and
largely uncoordinated, the two overriding concerns that emerged in 1965
were also pre-eminent in the 1975-1976 inquiries. These concerns were:
(1) the alleged Arab interference with American sovereignty, and (2) the
resulting injury to Israel. 127 Congress was plainly concerned about the
damage the Arab boycott could do to Israel by driving away American
business from that country. Congress was even more concerned about
the ability of the Arab boycotting countries to coerce American busi-
nesses and individuals into taking economic actions detrimental to a
close United States ally, and to other American businesses and individu-
als, contrary to the expressly stated position of the United States govern-
ment.12 8 Congress, the Executive Branch, and various states reacted to
these concerns by taking actions against the boycott during 1975 to 1977.
They attacked, in several different ways, the four levels of boycott
participation.
The Ford Administration reacted primarily to the level-three partic-
ipation by American firms, directing its efforts at discrimination against
Jewish Americans and refusals to deal with blacklisted companies.
While attacking boycott participation on a number of fronts, 129 the two
(presenting a summary of the 1976 antiboycott compromise). See also K. TESLIK, supra note
36, at 110, 112, 113.
127. Professor Henry Steiner has a somewhat different view of the reasons behind the laws.
He states that the two arguments by the proponents of strict antiboycott legislation were based
on moral, antidiscrimination principles and territorial sovereignty. Steiner, Pressures and Prin-
ciples-The Politics of the Antiboycott Legislation, 8 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 29, 534 (1978).
In this article, the author takes a view of the sovereignty concerns that encompasses both of
Steiner's elements, the discrimination and traditional territorial sovereignty concerns. Steiner
emphasizes the moral aspect of the antidiscrimination argument, id. at 535-37, but, in the
context of congressional response it was subsumed into the sovereignty arguments. This au-
thor places congressional concern regarding the impact of the boycott on Israel as a strong
motivating factor in addition to the sovereignty concerns. While not as clearly articulated as
the sovereignty concerns, the effect of the boycott on Israel and particularly on United States
trade with Israel, was a factor in the legistative consideration. The breadth of the ban on
refusals to trade with Israel is evidence of this. See infra text accompanying notes 234-37.
128. Part of this concern was due to the apparent reluctance of the United States govern-
ment to go beyond its expressions of opposition. "Despite the fact that it is explicit United
States policy under existing law to oppose foreign boycotts, implementation of that policy has
been largely weak and ineffective." SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 18.
129. See President Ford Statement, supra note 99, at 1305-06. Actions taken at this time
included a directive forbidding federal agencies from taking into account the racial or religious
exclusionary practices of foreign nations in making federal personnel decisions for assignments
to those nations, and an instrnction to the Secretary of Labor to see that federal contractors
complied with the same rule. Ford also commended the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., the Comptroller of the Currency and the
investment banking community on steps they had taken to deal with boycott-motivated reli-
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most significant of these administration efforts were: (1) revisions in the
Export Administration Regulations 3 ° to deal with religious discrimina-
tion and (2) the 1976 antitrust suit under the Sherman Act"' against the
Bechtel Corporation for conspiring to refuse to deal with blacklisted
companies. 32  President Ford initially attempted to deflect the an-
tiboycott legislation solely towards treatment of religious discrimina-
tion.' 33  He, however, ultimately supported a somewhat broader
approach. 134
Thirteen states135 addressed the boycott problem through legisla-
tion. All of the states sought to bar religious discrimination, but beyond
this there was very little agreement. In contrast with the congressional
concern over level-one and level-two participation through shipping cer-
tifications or questionnaires, only two states addressed the concern over
gious discrimination. In addition, he urged the other federal bank regulatory agencies to take
similar steps. Id; see also Effectiveness of Federal Enforcement Hearings (Part 1), supra note
120 (a detailed review of steps taken by the banking and securities regulators).
130. Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts, 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1976). See President Ford
Statement, supra note 99, at 1306. These revisions prohibited exporters and related service
organizations from furnishing information or taking any other action in compliance with dis-
criminatory boycott requests, 15 C.F.R. § 369.2, and required related service organizations to
file reports of boycott-related requests, 15 C.F.R. § 369.4. President Ford made an additional
revision in the antiboycott reporting regulations, requiring the public disclosure of boycott
reports, thus revealing those firms participating in the Arab Boycott. See A. LOWENFELD,
supra note 7, at 344.
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1985).
132. United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C-76-99-WAI (N.D. Cal., Jan. 25, 1979), 1979-1
Trade Reg. Ref. (CCH) § 62,430., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1083
(1981), proposed consent decree at 42 Fed. Reg. 12953 (1977). Comments and Dep't of Justice
response at 43 Fed. Reg. 12953 (1978). The application of the Sherman Act was never liti-
gated. No other actions were brought by the Justice Department. See Kestenbaum, The Anti-
trust Challenge to the Arab Boycott: Per Se Theory, Middle East Politics and United States v.
Bechtel Corporation, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1411 (1976); Schwartz, The Arab Boycott and American
Responses: Antitrust Law or Executive Discretions, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1260 (1976); and Areeda,
Remarks on the Arab Boycott, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1432 (1976). For a discussion of the antitrust
approach compared to the 1977 Export Administration Act Amendments, see Johnstone &
Paugh, The Arab Boycott of Israel: The Role of United State Antitrust Laws in the Wake of the
Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 661 (1978), and
Kestenbaum, The Arab Boycott in U.S. Law: Flawed Remedies for an International Trade
Restraint, 10 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 769 (1978).
133. See President Ford Statement, supra note 99; K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 103-04,
128-30.
134. See K. TESLIK supra note 36, at 151.
135. California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington all enacted statutes. See
generally Hirschhorn & Fenton, States, Rights and the Antiboycott Provision of the Export Ad-
ministration Act, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 518, 522-26 (1981).
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Arab boycott requirements for the furnishing of information, 136 and four
states specifically exempted shipping transactions from the coverage of
their antiboycott laws. 137 The different approaches taken by the various
states presented a crazy-quilt pattern of regulation and restriction to
companies seeking to comply with all of the rules. 138 In recognition of
this problem, these state laws were ultimately pre-empted by the 1977
amendments to the Export Administration Act.
1 39
C. The Tax Reform Act
Beginning in 1975, the primary focus of antiboycott attention was to
revise the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Act of
1969,14° which was scheduled to expire September 30, 1976.11 The first
legislation addressing the boycott, however, formed part of the 1976 Tax
Reform Act.142 Senator Abraham Ribicoff had introduced legislation in
early 1976143 to limit or deny certain foreign tax benefits'" to United
States taxpayers if they agreed to participate in the Arab boycott. No
hearings were held on this provision, nor was similar language ever con-
sidered by the House of Representatives. Senator Ribicoff, however, was
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.34 (1)(c)(d) (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 325,
§ 80155 subd. 1&2 (West 1977).
137. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-1256(c) § 42-1256(c) (1979); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 11-103(b) (Supp. 1981); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151E, § 2 (iv) (Michie/Law Coop. Supp.
1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75B-3 (1981).
138. See Hirschhorn & Fenton, supra note 136, at 522-25.
139. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (1985). For a discussion of the applicability of this provision
to the 1976 New York statute, see Lahoud, Federal and New York State Anti-Boycott Legisla-
tion: The Preemption Issue 14 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 371 (1982). In an effort to circum-
vent the preemption language of the EAA, New York City adopted a statute in 1978 barring
from contracting with the city any person found in violation of the EAA antiboycott provi-
sions. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. A 343-10.0 (1979). New York State adopted two similar laws
in 1981. N.Y. LAB. LAW 220-f (McKinney 1981-82) & N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW 139-h (McKin-
ney 1981-82). For a discussion of the fate of these laws under the EAA preemption clause see
Hirschhorn & Fenton supra, note 136, at 529-41. (The authors argued that the laws might
withstand preemption based on an expansive reading of National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). In light of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985), which reversed National League of Cities, even this slender support for the
laws has been cut away.)
140. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2413 (1975).
141. Id. § 2412.
142. Tax Reform Act of 1976, tit. X pt. ii, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1649 (codified at
I.R.C. § 999 (1985)).
143. S. 3138, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
144. Deferral of taxes on foreign income, I.R.C. § 908(a) (1986); foreign tax credits
§ 952(a)(3) (1986); and Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) benefits,
§ 995(b)(1)(F) (1986). The restrictions also apply to Foreign Sales Corporation Benefits
(FSC), § 927 (e)(2) (1986), adopted in 1984 to replace DISC.
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successful in having his proposal incorporated into the Senate version of
the 1976 Tax Reform Act.'45 Due to the precarious state of the efforts to
adopt more restrictive antiboycott amendments to the Export Adminis-
tration Act, 14 6 the Conferees adopted Senator Ribicoff's language which
became a part of the final version of the Tax Reform Act.
Senator Ribicoff's amendment was not offered as a comprehensive
response to American participation in the Arab boycott of Israel. The
rationale behind the law was that United States tax benefits should not be
available to taxpayers acting contrary to stated United States policy.' 47
This rationale also explains the primary limitation of the law-only those
firms qualifying for the designated tax benefits are affected. Taxpayers
not claiming those foreign tax benefits have no exposure under the law
and need not be concerned with its provisions.
In addition to its limited application, the amendment is also limited
in the type of boycott participation it addresses, particularly when com-
pared to the comprehensive language of the Export Administration Act
amendments adopted in 1977. The penalties under the law apply only if
a firm "participates in or cooperates with" a foreign boycott.' 48 Partici-
pation or cooperation in a boycott is defined to mean only agreements to
refuse to trade with or discriminate against targets of the boycott. 9
This is further limited by the law's acknowledgment of the Arab states'
right to conduct a primary boycott, and the exception in the law for
agreements restricting imports or exports between Israel and the Arab
boycotting countries.'5 0 Thus the Ribicoff Amendment only addressed
one form of level-two boycott participation: agreements to refuse to do
business with blacklisted concerns, with Jews, or with Israel.
The guidelines' promulgated by the Treasury Department for
compliance with the Ribicoff Amendment confirm the relatively narrow
reach of the law. In limited circumstances agreements to participate in a
boycott may be implied from acts of discrimination or refusals to deal;15
2
145. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 141-43.
146. Id. at 145.
147. I.R.C. § 999(b) (1986).
148. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3) (1986).
149. I.R.C. § 999(b)(4)(B) and (C) (1986).
150. 43 Fed. Reg. 3,454 (1978), amended or revised at 44 Fed. Reg. 66,272 (1979) and 49
Fed. Reg. 18,061 (1984) [hereinafter Treas. Guidelines]. There are no regulations implement-
ing the Ribicoff Amendment.
151. Treas. Guidelines, supra note 152, H-3, H-5, H-9 (1978).
152. Id., H-17, H-35 (1979). Under these examples, taxpayers agreeing to furnish a state-
ment that they are not blacklisted in conjunction with future shipments, have implicitly agreed
to refrain from dealing with Israel or with blacklisted concerns. The rationale is that there are
activities that could lead to taxpayers being blacklisted and, because they have agreed to certify
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such behavior is not, however, directly covered. Similarly, furnishing in-
formation to boycotting authorities, either through questionnaires or
routine transaction documents, is not penalized by the statutory lan-
guage. The implementing guidelines, however, do treat some agreements
to furnish information as agreements to refuse to do business.
153
In comparison with the more complex and comprehensive approach
of the Export Administration Act (EAA) Amendments adopted the next
year, the Ribicoff Amendment was a hurried effort to deal with some of
the problems of boycott participation. It addresses only one form of
level-two boycott participation and then only for a narrow category of
American firms. The EAA antiboycott provisions 54 address level-two
participation for most of these firms, yet, in some instances, arrive at
different conclusions. 55 Although the tax provisions have had some im-
pact,15 6 they have also resulted in confusion and criticism. 5 7 The overlap
with and contradiction of the EAA by the Ribicoff Amendment is one of
the ancillary dilemmas created by the congressional antiboycott efforts of
in the future that they are not blacklisted, they have agreed not to take actions that could cause
them to become blacklisted.
153. Id.
154. In general, firms subject to the Ribicoff antiboycott restrictions (United States taxpay-
ers) are also covered under the EAA definition of United States person. Because the EAA also
limits its application to those transactions in United States commerce, however, some activities
of United States taxpayers may not be subject to the EAA rules. See infra notes 193-99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of EAA jurisdictional requirements. No effort has ever
been made to determine the extent of business subject to the Ribicoff Amendment and not
subject to the EAA rules. This broader coverage is only relevant, however, to the extent the
taxpayer is claiming a foreign tax benefit subject to the antiboycott restrictions.
155. In most cases where there is disagreement between the Ribicoff Amendment and EAA
applications, the tax rules take the more restrictive position. For example, two of the most
significant exceptions to the EAA prohibitions, the "unilateral selection" and "compliance
with local law" provision have no parallel in the I.R.C. provision. See infra notes 227-30, 233
and accompanying text for a discussion of these exceptions. In two other situations, the Treas-
ury guidelines have interpreted conduct permissible under the EAA regulations as subject to
the tax penalties of the Ribcoff Amendment. The first involves so-called vessel eligibility state-
ments, compare Treas. Guidelines, supra note 152, M-9 through M-13 (1979), H- 40 (1984)
with 15 C.F.R. § 369 Supp. No. 1 (I), Supp. No.2 (1985). The second relates to agreements
that local laws apply solely to particular transactions. Compare Treas. Guidelines, supra note
152, H-3, H-4, H-37 through M-30 (1984), with 15 C.F.R. § 369.2 (a), "Examples of Refusals
and Agreeements to Refuse to Do Business," exs. (ii)-(iv) (1985).
156. See infra notes 260-73 and accompanying text.
157. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON EXPORT PROMOTION FUNCTIONS AND POTEN-
TIAL EXPORT DISINCENTIVES 9-15 to 9-18 (1980). "However, the existence of multiple
United States antiboycott programs is cited by some members of the business community as
troublesome. Of particular concern are the Treasury guidelines and certain activities prohib-
ited by Treasury that are permissible under the Commerce rules." Id.
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1976 and 1977.58
D. The Export Administration Act Amendments
The Export Administration Act of 1969,159 along with the an-
tiboycott language from 1965, was the 'primary vehicle for legislative pro-
posals to deal with the increased Arab boycott activity. Because the Act
was scheduled to expire on September 30, 1979,16 Congress held a series
of inquiries throughout 1975 and 1976. Discussion with the Ford Ad-
ministration became contentious at times,16 1 and the Commerce Depart-
ment's role in administering and enforcing the existing antiboycott
provisions came particularly into issue. 162 Congressional attention now
covered the full range of boycott participation by American firms. 163
In the late summer of 1976, the 1975 and 1976 inquiries ultimately
led to the adoption by the Senate and House of extremely different an-
tiboycott bills. The House language, which was the most restrictive, pro-
hibited "United States persons" from taking any action with the intent to
further a foreign boycott."64 This shotgun approach treated all forms of
participation the same 165 and made no allowances for compliance with
primary boycott-motivated conditions. In addition, the bill provided for
private actions for violations of the antiboycott provisions, and the col-
lection of treble damages. 166
Conversely, the Senate version 167 reached only two aspects of boy-
cott participation: the furnishing of information about the religion of
158. In general, the major Jewish organizations have opposed efforts to consolidate or har-
monize the two laws. Ad. at 9-17. See also K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 145.
159. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1975).
160. Id. § 2412.
161. See generally K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 125-67.
162. See, e.g., ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 5, at vii. "The Sub-
committee finds: (1) The practices and policies of the Department of Commerce have served
to thwart full implementation of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Act.
The Department has taken action reluctantly and only after Congress urged it to act more
decisively."
163. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
164. H.R. 15377, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 31970 (1976).
165. The bill did identify four nonexclusive categories of conduct which would be prohib-
ited: (1) discriminating against a United States person on the basis of "race, color, religion,
sex, nationality, or national origin"; (ii) refusing to deal with any United States person, boy-
cotted country, its nationals, or companies that do business with the boycotted country; (iii)
furnishing information about the "race, color, religion, sex, nationality, or national origin" of
the agents, officers, employees, etc., of American companies; and (iv) furnishing information
about business relationships with any United States person, boycotted country, its nationals, or
companies that do business with the boycotted country. Id. § 14(b), at 31971-72.
166. Id. at 31972.
167. S. 3084, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 28248 (1976).
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"United States persons," and the refusal to deal with "United States per-
sons" pursuant to boycott requirements. 68 In banning one narrow as-
pect of level-two participation, the demands for religious information,
and all level-three activity (refusals to trade with other "United States
persons"), the Senate focused on what it regarded as the most offensive
extraterritorial interference by the Arab boycotting countries in Ameri-
can economic relations.169 Notably absent at this stage was any concern
over level-one participation (the advertisement of American participation
in the boycott), which had been an issue in 1965 and would become a
major part of the ultimate EAA compromise.
Unofficial conferees of the House and Senate were able to reach a
compromise on the two bills in early fall of 1976."0 Although they elim-
inated the provisions that established a private right of action, 17 1 the
conferees agreed on prohibitions much closer to the House view. 172 The
conferees moved away from a single broad prohibition, agreeing instead
to a series of specific prohibitions.1 73 They also introduced the concept of
exceptions to the specific prohibitions, 74 for the first time formally rec-
ognizing the legitimacy of primary boycott conditions imposed on Amer-
ican firms. 75 The proposal attacked United States participation in the
Arab boycott at all four levels and imposed restrictions that were more
severe than the 1977 provisions which were ultimately adopted.' 76
168. Id. § 203(b), at 28250.
169. However, the Committee strongly believes that the United States should not ac-
quiesce in attempts by foreign governments through secondary and tertiary boycotts
to embroil American citizens in their battles against others by forcing them to par-
ticipate in actions which are repugnant to American values and traditions. Accord-
ingly, the bill reported by the Committee directly attacks attempts to interfere with
American internal affairs while creating mechanisms for more subtle and flexible
pressure against the other dimensions of foreign boycotts.
SENATE EAA REPORT 1976, supra note 97, at 19.
170. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 148-49.
171. This was the last appearance of a statutory private right of action in federal an-
tiboycott legislation. Two cases have been litigated on the question of whether an implied
private right of action exists under the 1977 EAA antiboycott provisions which were ulti-
mately adopted. One decision found such an implied right and the other rejected it. Compare
Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d
528 (5th Cir, 1986) with Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G. v. Sun Co., 83 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984).
172. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 148-49.
173. 122 CONG. REC. 35276 (1976) (statement of Rep. Bingham and summary of the infor-
mal compromise).
174. Id. at 35277.
175. Id. "The bill would permit compliance with foreign import and export requirements
linked to the direct primary boycott by Arab countries of Israel .. " Id.
176. In particular, the exceptions for compliance with local laws by United States compa-
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The 1976 compromise, however, was never enacted by Congress.
Because of both the adamant opposition to the bill by Senator James
Abourezk of South Dakota, and the resistance of the Ford Administra-
tion, a parliamentary maneuver prevented the House and Senate from
ever reaching an official compromise. 17 7 Congress adjourned in early Oc-
tober without renewing the Export Administration Act. 178
The United States response to the Arab boycott became a minor
campaign issue in the 1976 presidential campaign. 179 Candidate Carter
took a strong position in favor of antiboycott legislation."80 In 1977, a
new administration and new Congress reconsidered the antiboycott pro-
visions of the EAA. Beginning with the unofficial compromise reached
by the Congress in 1976, the House 8 ' and Senate' 8 2 again considered
imposing new restrictions on participation in the boycott. By this time,
the business community had become much more interested and more
involved in the process.183 Notwithstanding strong campaign rhetoric,
the Carter Administration became concerned that the antiboycott legisla-
tion might be too strong.'84 What initially appeared to be a relatively
simple enactment of the earlier compromise became -a much more diffi-
cult process.
At this point, representatives of three major Jewish service organiza-
tions 85 and the Business Roundtable' 86 held a series of discussions that
resulted in a joint statement of principles regarding the boycott and the
United States response. Built upon the 1976 compromise, this statement
nies and for compliance with "unilateral selections" made by boycotting country residents
were not part of the 1976 compromise. See infra notes 227-302, 233 and accompanying text
177. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 150-53. Sen. Abourezk and Sen. Tower of Texas on
behalf of the Administration blocked the appointment of offical Senate conferees on the bill.
Id.
178. President Ford extended the provisions of the law as of that date by executive author-
ity. Exec. Order No. 11,940, 41 Fed. Reg. 43,707 (1976).
179. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 154-55.
180. Id.
181. H.R. 1561, 95th Cong., Ist. Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 444-45 (1977).
182. S. 69, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 604 (1977); S. 92, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.,
123 CONG. REc. 648 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
183. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 168-72.
184. Id. at 182-86.
185. Id. at 175-79. The primary group involved was the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith. Also included in the negotiations were the American Jewish Congress and the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee.
186. Id. at 171; see also M. GREEN & A. BUCHSBAUM, THE CORPORATE LOBBIES: POLIT-
ICAL PROFILES OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE & THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 153-58
(1980) (critical view of the role the Business Roundtable played in the legislative
development).
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provided the impetus, after several stops and starts,87 for what was to
become the ultimate agreement on the 1977 amendments.
E. The Antiboycott Provisions of the EAA Detailed
Congress adopted an extensive program of antiboycott regulations
because the Arab boycott was viewed both as an attack on a close ally
and as an infringement on United States sovereignty. Concern regarding
the impact of the boycott on Israel pervaded the discussion, although the
concerns over sovereignty were more clearly articulated. Because of the
general perception that any limitations on the participation of American
firms in the Arab boycott would lessen its impact on Israel, only one
provision in the law is traceable to this concern: the ban on refusing to
trade with Israel. 88 Even this provision, however, is closely related to
the sovereignty concern of Congress.
The perceived interference with United States sovereignty fell into
two categories: (1) coercion of American businesses to implement Arab
states' foreign policy goals rather than the United States' goals and (2)
coercion of American businesses to discriminate against other American
businesses or individuals pursuant to Arab foreign policy goals.
American firms' participation in the implementation of the Arab
foreign policy goal of isolating Israel is reflected in three of the four levels
of boycott participation. Level-one activity, advertising boycott partici-
pation through statements and certifications, and level-two activity, as-
sisting in administering and enforcing the boycott through agreements,
questionnaires, and letters of credit, presented the greatest legislative
challenge because participation in these levels was so varied and perva-
sive. Level-four participation, refusing to deal with Israel, was easy to
legislate against, but it was more difficult to discover and eliminate.
The compliance by American businesses with Arab foreign policy
through discrimination against other Americans, either because of their
religion or their blacklist status (level-three participation), was also rela-
tively easy to outlaw. Practical problems of enforcement, such as identi-
fication, and the enormous potential for disruption of trade,189 led to the
acceptance of some significant limits on the attempts to curb this aspect
of extraterritoriality.
In responding to the Arab attack on United States sovereignty, Con-
187. See K. TESLIK, supra note 36, at 192-93, 207-10. See also Steiner, supra note 128, at
553-556.
188. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(A)(1986).
189. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 43-46 (describing the practical ne-
cessity for unilateral selection and compliance with local law exceptions).
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gress was forced to define which sovereign interests it desired to protect.
This was particularly important with regard to American operations in
foreign countries, because most countries did not share the hostile Amer-
ican perception of the Arab boycott.' 90 The United States approach in
defining the jurisdiction of the EAA antiboycott provisions was a blend
of territoriality, nationality, and the protective principle. 9 '
The EAA provisions (the Act) established a dual test for application
of the antiboycott provisions: the rules applied only to a "United States
person"' 192 engaged in an activity in "United States commerce."' 193 This
is a narrower test for jurisdiction than that used by the export control
provisions of the EAA.'19 4 The antiboycott definition of "United States
person" included firms "controlled in fact" by a United States-located
company. 195 Thus, the Act reached United States subsidiaries overseas.
The United States commerce part of the test, however, narrowed the
reach of the Act by limiting its application to transactions between the
United States and a foreign nation. Thus a United States subsidiary in a
foreign country would be subject to the Act only to the extent of its activ-
ities involving the "sale, purchase or transfer" of goods or services be-
tween that country and the United States. 196 Because this authority
extended to the resale of those goods from the foreign country to the
Arab world, the jurisdictional definition excited foreign concerns. 197
190. France enacted an antiboycott measure in 1977, but did not implement the law until
1981. See Phillips, The Arab Boycott of Israel: Possibilities for European Cooperation with US.
Antiboycott Legislation, CONG. REs. SERVICE (1979), at 41-44; Baker & Lallouette, U.S. Sub-
sidiaries in France Face Renewed Antiboycott Law, 7 Boyco-r L. BULL. 10 (Dec. 1981). Can-
ada adopted policy measures opposing the boycott, while the province of Ontario adopted an
antiboycott law. See Commerce Summaries: Industrial Countries, Antiboycott Policies, 4 BoY-
COTT L. BULL., 89, 92 (Apr. 1980). None of these laws was as extensive as the United States
law. In other countries there was little or no legal activity directed towards participation in
the boycott. See Phillips, supra, at ii-v.
191. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 18, at 452-60.
192. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1) (1986), defined at 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(b) (1985).
193. 50. U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(1986), defined at 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d) (1985).
194. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 340-42 (comparing the antiboycott rules definition to
the export controls provisions of the EAA).
195. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c) (1985). The basic test is whether the parent has the "authority
or ability" to "establish the general policies or to control day-to-day operations" of the related
foreign firm. See id. § 369. 1(c)(1). Several rebuttable presumptions of control were created
based on ownership of voting securities, interlocking directorates, and the United States par-
ent's appointive authority over the related firm's board and officers. See id. § 369.1(c)(2).
196. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d) (1985). The regulations include twenty examples of transactions
illustrating the application of the rules. Supplement 8 to the regulations further refined the
definition to indicate that "sale or purchase" of the goods referred to exchange of title or
ownership rather than the actual physical movement of the goods. 15 C.F.R. § 369 Supp. No.
8 (1985).
197. See A. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISIDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION
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Defining the jurisdiction of what is essentially a blocking statute is
difficult, especially for a country such as the United States, which has an
expansive view of its jurisdictional prerogatives. Under the definitions
set forth in the 1977 EAA antiboycott provisions, the United States at-
tempted to block the impact of the Arab boycott laws, not just at the
United States borders, but anywhere that the United States perceived its
economic jurisdiction to extend. This presented the potential for conflict
when foreign subsidiaries of American firms were faced with conflicting
boycott and antiboycott demands in nations more sympathetic to trade
with the Arab states than to United States trade laws. 198
The EAA antiboycott provisions adopted in 1977 consist of the fol-
lowing three parts: (1) a set of prohibitions, (2) corresponding excep-
tions, and (3) the strengthened reporting requirements from the 1965
Act. The following is a brief description of the three different parts and a
more detailed discussion of how they relate to the four different levels of
boycott participation.
1. Prohibitions
The statute describes six categories of prohibited conduct and im-
poses an additional ban on any other action taken with "intent to evade"
the six prohibitions. 199 A necessary element of any violation of the Act is
that the prohibited action be taken with the "intent to comply with, fur-
ther, or support an unsanctioned foreign boycott." 2" The actions de-
scribed are prohibited, along with agreements to take such actions. The
ban on agreements is a central part of the regulatory scheme and is, in
some respects, more important than the ban on the conduct itself.2 ' The
six prohibited activities are:
(1) refusing to do business with any person when the refusal is pur-
suant to a boycott requirement, request, or agreement with the boycott-
ing country;20 2
oF LEGAL MATERIALS 147-49 (1983) (reprinting excerpts of correspondence from the British
Government to the United States Government over the definition of "United States person" in
the 1977 Export Administration Amendments, antiboycott provisions, and implementing
regulations).
198. See infra notes 389-394 and accompanying text.
199. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(5) (1986). "Evasion" under the statute is defined at 15
C.F.R. § 369.4 (1985).
200. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1) (1986). "Intent" is defined at 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e) (1985).
201. Agreements are generally much easier to prove, being incorporated into a writing of
some kind in most instances. This is reflected in the enforcement record of the Commerce
Department. See infra Table 3.
202. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(A) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.2(a) (1985).
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(2) discriminating against a United States person20 3 on the basis of
race, religion, sex, or national origin;2 4
(3) furnishing information about the race, religion, sex, or national
origin of an American;0 5
(4) furnishing information about the business relationships of any
person with a boycotted country, a boycotted country's nationals, or
blacklisted firms; 2
6
(5) furnishing information about any person's affiliation with char-
itable or fraternal organizations that support a boycotting country;20 7
and
(6) "[p]aying, honoring, confirming or otherwise implementing"2 8
a letter of credit containing terms with which compliance is outlawed by
the other five prohibitions.
20 9
2. Exceptions
As previously discussed, the 1976 legislation included language per-
mitting American firms to comply with the primary boycott aspects of
the Arab boycott. The 1977 amendments expanded the scope of these
exceptions in several critical respects. In particular, the exceptions rec-
ognized the futility of conflict with the Arab states in cases where the
203. While the refusal to deal prohibition applies to refusal to trade with any person, the
protection afforded by discrimination prohibition is limited to discrimination against United
States persons. Unlike the refusal to deal prohibition, however, proof of prohibited discrimina-
tion does not include proof that the action was pursuant to a specific boycott requirement,
request, or agreement. Thus discrimination by persons who only perceive that it is a required
element of the boycott is covered under the provision. This extension of coverage has been
described as the "shadow boycott." See K. TESLIK supra note 36, at 15-16.
204. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(B) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.2(b) (1985).
205. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (a)(1)(C) (1986), implementing regulations set forth at 15
C.F.R. § 369.2(c) (1985).
206. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(D) (1986), implementing regulations set forth at 15
C.F.R. § 369.2(d) (1985). The prohibition on furnishing information about business relation-
ships with blacklisted firms leads to some difficult conceptual problems. For instance, example
(x) under the regulations provides that a firm may not certify that its supplier is not blacklisted.
While the regulations ban furnishing information about relationships with blacklisted persons,
what relationship has the firm provided information about when it states that its supplier is not
blacklisted? Arguably, by saying a supplier is not blacklisted, the firm is saying that for the
particular transaction the firm is not dealing with a certain blacklisted (albeit unknown) sup-
plier. This is, however, a somewhat strained reading of the statutory language.
207. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(E) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.2(e) (1985).
208. 50. U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(F) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.2(f) (1985).
209. Id.
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territorial and nationality jurisdiction of these states is both theoretically
and practically supreme, that is, within their borders for American firms
conducting business there, and at their borders for American firms ship-
ping goods in or out. Thus, the exceptions sought ways to permit Ameri-
can firms to continue to conduct business with the Arab states,
notwithstanding continued enforcement of the boycott. The conduct
permitted as exceptions to the prohibitions includes: (1) compliance
with boycotting country import, shipping, and carriage restrictions on
goods or services from the boycotted country or on vessels of the boy-
cotted country;210 (2) compliance with boycotting country import and
shipping documentary requirements (such as requirements for shipping
certifications) relating to the origin of goods or services (expressed in pos-
itive terms only),211 and route and carrier of the shipment;21 2 (3) compli-
ance with the unilateral and specific selection of goods or services by a
boycotting country, national, or resident;21 3 (4) compliance with boy-
cotting country export requirements restricting shipments to the boy-
cotted country;214 (5) compliance by an individual with immigration,
passport, visa, or work permit requirements of the boycotting country; 215
and (6) compliance with local laws, including import laws, of a boycott-
ing country by Americans who are bona fide residents2O 1 6 of the boycott-
ing country.217
3. Reporting Requirements
The 1977 amendments extended the reporting requirements to all
persons subject to the Act 2 8 and mandated that the reports be made
210. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(A) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(a-1), (a-2) (1985).
211. The effect of this provision was to outlaw the negative statement of origin of goods
("shipment contains no Israeli goods"), notwithstanding its obvious primary boycott purpose.
212. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(B) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(b) (1985).
213. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(C) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(c) (1985).
214. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(D) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(d) (1985).
215. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(E) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(e) (1985).
216. The regulations left the term "bona fide resident" undefined, although they set out a
series of factors for consideration, indicating a commercial necessity test. 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(f)(3) (1985).
217. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(F) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(f), (f-l), (f-2) (1985).
218. One of the criticisms of the Commerce Department administration of the 1965 EAA
antiboycott terms was the limitation of the reporting requirements to exporters. The Depart-
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public.219 Congress strongly criticized the enforcement effort which the
Department of Commerce had directed towards the reporting rules
under the 1965 Act and indicated that these rules should be treated as a
significant part of the statutory scheme.22°
4. EAA Impact on the Four Levels of Participation
The 1977 amendments addressed all four levels of boycott participa-
tion. The emphasis of Congress on the more formalistic aspects of com-
pliance becomes apparent by examining the application of the new rules
to each level of boycott participation. Correspondingly apparent is the
unwillingness of Congress to create major conflicts, notwithstanding se-
vere policy disagreements, in situations in which the Arab states had
clearly superior jurisdictional claims.
a) Level One: Manifestations of Participation
Congress attacked the required manifestations of participation by
barring the furnishing of information about business relationships.
American firms were prevented from making statements about the black-
list status of their supplier, carrier, or insurer. The exception which pro-
vided for compliance with documentary import requirements
acknowledged compliance with primary boycott requirements, but in a
limited fashion. While the exception permitted firms to certify that the
carrier was not Israeli, or would not call at an Israeli port (characterized
in the statute as "war risk" terms rather than boycott terms), 221 the ex-
ception did not permit a certification that the goods were not of Israeli
origin. This primary boycott device was considered such an obvious
symbol of complicity with the boycott that it was singled out for banning
despite the avowed purpose of the exceptions to permit primary boycott
participation.222
One exception to the ban on statements and certifications evidencing
support for the boycott crept in through the regulations. Statements by
Americans that they themselves were not blacklisted were determined by
the Commerce Department not to constitute any manner of furnishing
information, and thus fell outside the scope of the prohibition. This deci-
ment revised its regulations in November 1975 to include banks, freight forwarders, and other
export service organizations. See supra note 83. Congress made the change permanent in the
1977 law. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(b)(2) (1986).
219. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(b)(2) (1986).
220. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 18-19.
221. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(B) (1986).
222. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 24.
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sion resulted in the widespread use of such "self-certifications. 223
b) Level Two: Participation in Enforcement and Administration
Several of the prohibitions addressed participation in enforcement
and administration of the boycott. The bans on furnishing information
regarding business relationships and religion applied to the question-
naires and other more detailed inquiries received by American firms.
The ban on agreements to discriminate or refuse to do business applied to
contractual conditions, and the ban on implementing letters of credit
with illegal boycott terms addressed the complicity of the banks in the
enforcement of the boycott.
Exceptions recognizing the primary boycott at this level permitted
agreements not to import Israeli goods into the boycotting country and
agreements not to use Israeli ships or ships that called on Israeli ports.
Two other exceptions, however, placed substantial limitations on the ef-
fect of the prohibitions at this level.
The Act permitted individuals to respond to questions about their
own religion in order to comply with a boycotting country's immigration
or passport requirements.224 The regulations further defined the rule to
permit firms to facilitate the furnishing of such information by their em-
ployees.225 Thus, while the Act prevents a company from directly ad-
ministering the religious information demanded by the boycotting Arab
states, it creates a procedure to accomplish substantially the same end.
The other exception affecting participation at this level operates
somewhat more narrowly. Under the exception allowing compliance
223. The decision to permit this statement was extremely controversial. Although the origi-
nal regulations indicated that such statements were not prohibited, this was expressed in an
extremely indirect fashion. Section 369.2(f), "Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of
Credit", example (xiv) provided that a bank could implement a letter of credit containing a
requirement that the beneficiary certify it was not blacklisted. By implication, if a bank was
free to implement a letter of credit with that requirement, the requirement was permissible
(since banks were prohibited from implementing letters of credit with prohibited require-
ments). It was not until an interpretation was published in 1982 that the Department stated
directly that a United States person could say that he was not blacklisted. 15 C.F.R. § 369
Supp. No.5 A.2. (1985).
224. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(E) (1986), implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(e) (1985).
225. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(e)(3) (1985).
A United States person may also perform any ministerial acts to expedite processing
of applications by individuals. These include informing employees of boycotting
country visa requirements at an appropriate time; typing, translation, messenger and
similar services; and assisting in or arranging for the expeditious processing of appli-
cations. All such actions must be undertaken on a nondiscriminatory basis.
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with local law, firms that are bona fide residents of the boycotting coun-
try can furnish otherwise prohibited business relationship information.
Thus, an American company resident in Saudi Arabia may answer ques-
tions about its dealings with Israel, with blacklisted firms, or about any
other person's relationships with those. entities.226 The exception was, in
part, a concession to the overriding jurisdictional claims that a boycott-
ing country has on its residents. The exception has also become a prag-
matic device to deal with Arab demands for information that could
otherwise lead to blacklisting,227 and, for this reason, has been somewhat
expanded. 28 The exception also permits agreements by the resident
company which are otherwise prohibited by the Act, but limits their ap-
plication to the company's activities exclusively within the boycotting
country. This aspect of the exception is thus of comparatively little value
for extraterritorial administration or enforcement of the boycott.
229
c) Level Three: Discrimination Against Real and Corporate
Persons
Coerced discrimination against blacklisted firms and Jews is the
form of boycott participation most removed from the primary conflict, as
well as the form most resented by Congress. Two of the prohibitions di-
rectly bar boycott-based refusals to trade and religious discrimination.
Ironically, however, the exceptions make more substantial inroads into
these prohibitions than into any other portions of the Act.
Examining religious discrimination first, the regulations implement-
ing the passport and immigration exception provide that an American
firm may replace an employee who is denied permission to enter a coun-
try on religious grounds.230 In fact, obtaining such permission may even
226. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-1), "Activities Exclusively Within a Foreign Country," exs. (iii)-
(v) (1985).
227. Article 15(g) of the General Principles of the Boycott of Israel provides that a firm
may be blacklisted "[i]f, within the period of warning, they refuse to reply to questions submit-
ted to them with a view to clarifying their position and determining their relationship with
Israel." Reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at DS-405.
228. The original regulations included examples illustrating circumstances in which a non-
resident firm could provide otherwise prohibited information, if so required, in order to become
a bona fide resident. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f), "Examples of Bona Fide Residency," exs. (iii)-(vi)
(1985). In 1982, the Department of Commerce issued an interpretation providing more guide-
lines on situations in which a nonresident might furnish information. 15 C.F.R. § 369 Supp.
No. 5B (1985).
229. See 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-1),"Activities Exclusively Within a Foreign Country," ex. (vi)
(1985) (an agreement not to sell to Israel any output of a manufacturing facility, operated
within the boycotting country, is not an activity exclusively within the boycotting country).
230. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(e), "Examples of Compliance with Immigration, Passport, Visa or
Employment Requirements of a Boycotting Country," exs. (iv), (v), (vii) (1986). This is con-
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be made a condition of employment.231 Thus, while an American firm
may not itself discriminate, it may comply with the discrimination of the
Arab government. Given the absolute power of Arab governments over
their immigration rules, strict enforcement of the prohibition would have
meant either loss of substantial business in boycotting countries or en-
hanced pressure on American firms to avoid hiring or assigning Jews to
those positions. Under the approach adopted, the American firm is
banned from exercising its own discretion contrary to the terms of the
antiboycott law, but is permitted to implement an otherwise illegal dis-
cretionary determination made by a party not subject to the prohibitions.
The unilateral selection exception is the more widely used example
of this principle. This exception permits American firms to implement
purchasing decisions that are, based on the blacklist, made by boycotting
country nationals or residents.232 While the firm may still not exercise its
discretion to refuse to trade with a blacklisted concern, it may execute
that refusal once the decision is made by a party not subject to the
prohibition.
The net effect of these two exceptions is to alter the form but not the
substance of boycott participation. If the selection processes are properly
structured, the American firm can avoid violating the law, yet execute
the discriminatory decision. Given the prerogative of the boycotting
countries to ban Jewish employees and blacklisted goods at their borders,
a total, enforceable ban on level-three participation could have resulted
in substantial trade disruption. By forcing the boycott decision back into
sistent with the legislative history. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 24 ("In
addition, this provision means that even if certain of a United States company's employees are
denied entry for boycott reasons, that company may nonetheless proceed with a project in the
boycotting country.").
231. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(e), "Examples of Compliance with Immigration, Passport, Visa or
Employment Requirements of a Boycotting Country," exs. (iv), (v), (vii) (1986). Example (iv)
discusses use of the exception when selecting current employees for an assignment, while ex-
ample (v) discusses simply selecting employees, and then selecting others when the original
selection is rejected. The Department's informal position, while the author was in his position
at the Office of Antiboycott Compliance, was that obtaining a work permit or visa was a legiti-
mate precondition to employment.
232. This definition includes the bona fide resident operations of American firms. Thus
United States persons who qualify as residents of the boycotting country may have their selec-
tion of goods or services carried out by other United States persons located outside the boy-
cotting country. Even affiliated concerns may take advantage of this exception, permitting a
Saudi Arabian subsidiary of an American firm to order purchases by the parent using blacklist-
ing criteria. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(7), § 369.3(c)(8), "Boycotting Country Buyer," ex. (iii)
(1986). This example concludes with the admonition: "Unilateral selections involving related
United States persons will be scrutinized carefully to ensure that the selection was in fact made
by the bona fide resident of the boycotting country." Id.
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the boycotting country and away from the United States, the Act forced
the boycotting states back to their territorial jurisdiction. Permitting
American firms to execute these territorial decisions represents a practi-
cal middle ground between not trading with the countries and unfettered
complicity in their boycott.
d) Level Four: Discrimination Against Israel
Arab demands for participation in their boycott through refusing to
trade with Israel are the demands that are the broadest in scope, as dis-
cussed earlier.233 The EAA prohibition against refusing to trade with
Israel is similarly the broadest ban on boycott participation. It is limited
only by the primary boycott exceptions, also discussed earlier,234 that
permit American firms to refuse to sell Israeli goods to the Arab states
and Arab goods to Israel. American firms may not refuse to trade on a
general basis with a country pursuant to boycott demands.
This prohibition establishes, in theory, the greatest potential area for
conflict between the provisions of the Act. The statute provides, how-
ever, that the "mere absence of a business relationship with or in the
boycotted country" does not constitute a violation of the prohibition.235
The difficulty of the administrative task of determining when a company
trading with the Arab states and not trading with Israel is refraining
from Israeli trade pursuant to a boycott requirement, or for legitimate
commercial reasons, has served to disguise the extent of the conflict. The
Commerce Department's failure to perform this administrative task, and
the implications of that failure, are considered later.236
IV. ARAB RESPONSE TO THE LAWS
The antiboycott provisions of the EAA had almost an immediate
effect on the boycott requirements of the Arab countries. While serious
problems remained, the Arab countries changed many of their proce-
dures to conform to the terms of the new law. These changes involved a
partial withdrawal of many of the extraterritorial demands of the boy-
cotting states, and substantially reduced the areas of conflict between the
boycott and United States laws. Responses at each level of participation
will be considered in turn.
233. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
235. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
236. See infra text accompanying notes 379-80.
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A. Level One: Manifestations of Participation
Beginning in 1976, the Arab boycotting countries made substantial
changes in their trade documentation requirements. All of the boycott-
ing states except Iraq began accepting positive statements of origin in lieu
of the non-Israel certifications.237 Saudi Arabia adopted standard terms
for certificates of origin and shipping clauses that conformed to United
States antiboycott requirements. 238 These terms became the model for
other nations.23 9 In addition, there was a general reduction in demands
relating to the blacklist status of carriers or insurers.24° Demands re-
237. The Commerce Department solicited information from American embassies in the
boycotting countries concerning those countries' boycott enforcement policies and practices.
Commerce maintained a current compilation of this information through 1980. The informa-
tion was requested under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1986), by the
Boycott Law Bulletin and reprinted in the Boycotting Countries' Policies column in consecu-
tive issues of that monthly publication. 4 BOYCOTT L. BULL. 78-81 (1980) (Algeria, Bahrain,
Egypt); 4 BOYCOTT L. BULL. 100-03 (1980) (Iraq, Jordon, Kuwait); 4 BOYCOTT L. BULL. 123-
25 (1980) (Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar); 4 BOYCOTT L. BULL. 152-58 (1980) (Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, U.A.E., Yemen (Sana)).
238. See Saudi Arabia Issues New Policy on Shipping Documents and LOC's, 2 BoYcoTT L.
BULL. 105 (1978). The Department of Commerce issued an interpretation indicating its ap-
proval of the new Saudi language. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,969 (1978), (codified at 15 C.F.R. § 369
Supp. No. 1 (1986)). The Department of Treasury, however, initially rejected the language as
inconsistent with the provisions of I.R.C. § 999. See Bruzonsky, Commerce!Treasur Enforce-
ment, 3 BoYcoTr L. BULL. 69 (1979). Ultimately, Saudi Arabia provided an assurance to
Treasury that the new shipping documentation language it had adopted was not, in fact, boy-
cott-related. Bruzonsky, supra, at 344. Both Commerce and Treasury then issued formal
views exempting the Saudi Arabian language from their respective antiboycott regulations, 44
Fed. Reg. 55,272 (1979) (Treasury); 44 Fed. Reg. 67,374 (1979) (codified at 15 C.F.R. § 369
Supp. No. 2 (1986) (Commerce). See generally Gray, New Guidelines and Interpretation: Their
Effect on Trading Practices, 2 BoYcoTr L. BULL. 352 (1979).
239. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates both adopted the Saudi Arabian shipping
clause approved by the Commerce Department. The U.A.E. adopted the insurance clause as
well. (Kuwait is a self- insurer, so it had no need for the clause.) Neither country, however,
would provide the kind of assurance offered by the Saudis, that the term was not boycott-
related. See Boycotting Countries' Policies, 4 BOYCOTT L. BULL. 236, 237-38 (1980). Treas-
ury's view that this language, absent a Saudi-like assurance, is contrary to I.R.C. § 999 has
continued to be a major problem for American firms. See Boycotting Countries' Policies, 8
BoYcoTr L. BULL. 6 (Oct. 1984).
240. According to Commerce Department reports, requests relating to the blacklist status
of carriers dropped from 51,682 in fiscal 1977 to 18,802 in 1980 (over 8,000 of the 1980 re-
quests came from Kuwait and the U.A.E.--countries using the variation of the shipping lan-
guage approved by the United States). Similarly, blacklisted insurance company requests
dropped from 4,265 in 1977 to 1,052 in 1980. See BUREAU OF EAST-WEsT TRADE, DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 115TH Ex-
PORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 16 (Oct. 1976-Mar. 1977) [hereinafter 115TH EXPORT AD-
MINISTRATION REPORT 1977]; BUREAU OF EAST-WEST TRADE, DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 116TH EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION REPORT 25 (Apr.-Sept. 1977) [hereinafter 116th EXPORT ADMINISTRA-
TION REPORT]; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1980, supra note 72, at 82.
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garding the blacklist status of suppliers also quickly diminished.24'
As indicated earlier, the documentary statements and certifications
required at this level manifested participation in primary, secondary, and
tertiary aspects of the boycott. The EAA imposed some limits on all of
these documentary requirements. In general, the boycotting countries
were willing to accept these limitations on the information that Ameri-
can firms were permitted to provide.
B. Level Two: Participation in Enforcement and Administration
The boycotting countries made substantial concessions to both an-
tiboycott laws with regard to their demands for participation in enforce-
ment and administration of the boycott. With regard to participation
agreements, Saudi Arabia again adopted standard government contract
language tailored to meet the requirements of the two antiboycott stat-
utes.242 While retaining permissible primary boycott conditions, the sec-
ondary and tertiary references in the agreements were significantly
reduced.243
Because of the changes in the export and shipping documentation
requirements, pressure on American banks to implement letters of credit
enforcing boycott terms was significantly reduced. 2" Most Arab banks
issuing letters of credit stopped using the prohibited terms, 245 and Ameri-
can banks were generally able to eliminate those terms still imposed
through negotiation with Arab banks.246 This development almost elimi-
241. In 1977 there were 24,353 such requests reported, 115TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
REPORT 1977, supra note 241, at 6, 116TH EXPORT ADMININSTRATION REPORT (1977), supra
note 241 at 25, compared to 1,616 in 1980. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1980, supra
note 72, at 82.
242. See Gray, No Apparent EAA & TRA Conflict Posed by New Saudi Boycott Clause, 3
BoYcoTT L. BULL. 77, 78 (1979). The language adopted was basically that approved by the
Commerce Department in its first interpretation. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,969 (1978) (codified at 15
C.F.R. § 369 Supp. No. 1 (II) (1986)).
243. See supra notes 241-45. The Commerce Department does not separate requests for
certification from requests for agreements or conditions on sales. Another factor showing the
reduction in these conditions is the drop in boycott terms reported in purchase orders, from
6,878 in 1977 to 2,338 in 1980. Compare 115TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1977,
supra note 241, at 18; and 116TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1977, supra note 241, at
27; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1980, supra note 72, at 84.
244. Because the prohibition relating to letters of credit applied only to letters of credit
containing forbidden terms or conditions, the reduction in forbidden terms by the boycotting
countries lead to a corresponding reduction in impermissible letters of credit. See supra notes
215-19 and accompanying text.
245. Id.
246. See Note, Through the Antiboycott Morass to an Export Priority, 9 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 357, 399 (1979).
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nated one of the major extraterritorial applications of the boycott.
The Arab states, however, modified their demands for information
much less than the other requirements for level-two participation. The
already small number of reported requests for religious information or
instances of discrimination declined,24 as did the number of boycott
questionnaires reported.248 Moreover, a number of countries dropped
the boycott questions from their trademark and patent registration appli-
cations.249 Use of the questionnaire to resolve questions relating to
blacklist status continued, however, and even increased in some circum-
stances.250 Several American companies, confronted with a choice be-
tween complying with the United States law prohibiting responses to the
questions and the possibility of being blacklisted for not responding, un-
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the EAA ban.251 The un-
resolved conflict between the boycott and antiboycott requirements on
this point stands out as the most contentious because of the impact on
American firms caught between the two sets of requirements, and the
247. Requests for religious information predominate this category. There were 82 requests
for either religious information or discrimination in 1977 (the Commerce Department com-
bined the reporting categories of "discriminating questionnaires" and "other discriminatory
requests" into one discrimination category between the first and second reports in 1977), com-
pared to 30 for 1980. See 115TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1977, supra note 241, at
16; 116TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT 1977, supra note 241, at 26; EXPORT ADMINIS-
TRATION REPORT 1980, supra note 72, at 82.
248. Three hundred fifty-four questionnaires were reported in 1977 while only 84 were
reported for 1980. See 115TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1977, supra note 241, at 16;
116TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1977, supra note 241, at 27; EXPORT ADMINIS-
TRATION REPORT 1980, supra note 72, at 84.
249. See supra note 257.
250. The most troublesome use of the questionnaire was in efforts by boycotting country
officials to verify relationships between firms with similar names. American companies with
names containing words the same as, or similar to, the names of other firms on the blacklist
were often given questionnaires to disprove their affiliation. See, e.g., Boycotting Countries'
Policies, 6 BoYcoTT L. BULL. 24, 24-25 (Apr. 1982); ("Alarming Development-Major Arab
States are Sending Dreaded Boycott Questionnaires to U.S. Firms on Basis of Name Similarity
With Other Firms on Blacklists"); Boycotting Countries' Policies, 7 BoYcoTT L. BULL. 11, 11-
12 (June 1983) ("Boycott Officers Meeting Nixes U.S. Hopes for Solution to Growing Problem
with the Similar-Name Boycott Queries"); Boycotting Countries' Policies, 9 BoYcoTT L. BULL.
19 (Jan. 1985) (Saudis may take action on similar name problems, but results not certain). The
Commerce Department issued its interpretation on permissible furnishing information in No-
vember 1982 in part as a response to this problem. 47 Fed. Reg. 52,991 (1982) (codified at 15
C.F.R. § 369 Supp. No. 5 (1986)). One early enforcement action generated by the similar
name problem was brought against Columbia Pictures, Inc., for allegedly responding to ques-
tions about its relationship with the blacklisted Columbia Broadcasting System. See infra
notes 329, 332.
251. Trane v. Baldrige, 552 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1983); Briggs & Stratton v. Baldrige,
539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Wis. 1982), consolidated on appeal, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied - U.S. - , 105 S. Ct. 105 (1985).
1987]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
vigor of the Commerce Department's enforcement of the applicable part
of the law. 52
C. Level Three: Discrimination Against Real and Corporate Persons
Arab modification of demands for level-three participation consisted
generally of acceptance of the procedures outlined in the EAA for unilat-
eral selection of blacklisted suppliers. Saudi Arabia formally adopted a
contract clause setting forth its right to make unilateral selections.25 3
Once a boycotting state assumes responsibility for making blacklist-based
determinations, conflicts at this level can be largely eliminated. The fact
that not all boycotting country customers were willing to adopt this pro-
cedure, however, left some substantial problems.
The boycotting countries' response to the ban on religious discrimi-
nation, much like the extent of coerced discrimination itself, 54 is difficult
to gauge.2 55 The regulations permitted firms to continue to conduct busi-
ness in a boycotting country after an employee was denied entry on reli-
gious grounds.256 Thus, a procedure was approved for accomplishing the
objective of excluding certain persons without forcing American firms to
exercise their discretion. There is evidence that Jews were denied visas or
work permits, 57 but the extent to which this indicated adoption of the
procedure is unclear.
D. Level Four: Discrimination Against Israel
Boycott-induced discrimination against Israel is difficult to measure,
and the absence of enforcement activity for violations of the EAA ban on
refusals to trade with Israel makes any assessment of Arab response to
the law even more conjectural. There is some available evidence of com-
promises by the Arab boycotting countries, which indicates pragmatic
252. See infra notes 329-33 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 243.
254. See supra note 128.
255. At least one instance of overt discrimination against Jews by the Syrian government
was reported. Boycotting Countries' Policies, 6 BoYcOrr L. BULL. 22, 22-23 (Mar. 1982)
("Syrian Ministry of Defense Contract Bars Employment of Jews; Clause is Rejected by Sev-
eral U.S. Companies and Jewish Group Protests to Syrian Ambassador in Washington"). This
was extremely unusual, however.
256. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(e)(4) (1986).
257. In a 1984 letter to the American Jewish Congress, the Office of the Near East at the
United States Department of Commerce acknowledged past Saudi Arabian discrimination
against Jews in its visa policy. It indicated, however, that the current official policy of the
Saudi government was nondiscriminatory. Boycotting Countries' Policies, 8 BoYcoTr L.
BULL. 5, 6 (Jan. 1984) ("Commerce Says Saudis Do Not Discriminate Against Jews in Visa
Policy").
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concessions were made.25 8
Notwithstanding Arab flexibility in responding to certain aspects of
the antiboycott laws, Arab adherence to their initial position seeking to
coerce a secondary boycott of Israel is logical. The jurisdictional claims
of the Arab states are more rational when denying persons trading privi-
leges within the Arab states for dealings with Israel than when trying to
enlist their assistance against other firms trading with Israel. The evi-
dence indicates that the Arab states continued to seek to force most firms
to chose between Arab or Israeli trade. Their disproportionate economic
strength continued to make this a coercive assertion of extraterritorial
influence. Additionally, in seeking accommodation on this aspect of boy-
cott enforcement the United States was at its weakest. Considering the
program of trade controls it employs, the United States can hardly argue
that nations with international economic leverage are not entitled to use
that leverage to effectuate their foreign policy goals.
The Arab states nonetheless quickly made substantial changes in
their boycott operation to accommodate the United States antiboycott
laws. Conflicts remained, however, and the degree of the concessions
varied from country to country and from ministry to ministry within
countries. While all firms faced the complexity of two new regulatory
schemes, many companies were still confronted with a choice between
compliance with United States laws or compliance with boycott de-
mands. It is appropriate as the next step in determining the impact of the
laws to review the effectiveness of the enforcement effort.
V. THE ENFORCEMENT RECORD
A. Introduction
The following review of the enforcement record of the Departments
of the Treasury and of Commerce demonstrates the emphasis placed on
implementation of the two laws restricting level-one and level-two boy-
cott participation. The Treasury rules, of course, deal solely with level-
two participation. The EAA bars participation at all four levels, but the
enforcement efforts of the Commerce Department have focused almost
exclusively on levels one and two. This result emanates, in part, from the
258. Because of a number of problems with the blacklisting of computer companies work-
ing for various Arab countries, the boycott officials of the Arab nations reportedly created an
exemption for these firms similar to existing exemptions for military equipment. This enabled
computer firms to serve both Israeli and Arab markets. Boycotting Countries' Policies, 8 Boy-
corr L. BULL. 15, 15-16 (Sept. 1984) ("Boycott Liaison Officers Meeting: Decisions Taken
Concerning Computer Firms, Oil Discharge Certificates, Other Matters").
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pervasive character of participation demands at these levels and from the
more readily detectable nature of level-one and level-two infractions.
Both the Treasury and Commerce Departments have reported sub-
stantial enforcement activity since they began actively pursuing viola-
tions. Information about the Treasury record, however, is only available
in summary form because of the confidential nature of tax reporting and
enforcement. The majority of the following discussion will be devoted to
the Commerce record, which by law is public information.259
B. Treasury Enforcement
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) antiboycott provisions reinforce
the ban that the EAA provisions impose on boycott administration and
enforcement agreements (level-two boycott participation). While the tax
law applies to a slightly greater number of transactions, 260 and penalizes
some conduct not barred by the EAA,2 6 1 its role generally is a supple-
mentary one. The four Treasury reports on the operation of Section
999262 provide some interesting general information on compliance with
the rules by taxpayers, as well as some summary information about en-
forcement. While the data provides more insights into possible inadequa-
cies of IRS enforcement than the impact of the laws on the compliance of
American firms with the Arab boycott, it still merits some attention.
The four reports reflect a continual increase in audit activity from
the nine firms reviewed as of October 1978263 through the 860 firms au-
dited in 1983, the last year covered by the reports.26  As a result, there
was a correspondent increase in revenues gained from zero gain in
1978265 to $5.5 million in additional revenues for 1983.266 There is no
259. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. 1986). "Any charging letter or other
document initiating administrative proceedings for the imposition of sanctions for violations of
the regulations issued pursuant to [the antiboycott provisions] of this Act shall be made avail-
able for public inspection and copying." Id. See also SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note
7, at 28. "The previous practice of keeping such proceedings secret impeded the gathering of
all relevant evidence and deprived the public of an opportunity to assess the seriousness and
vigor of enforcement action." Id.
260. See supra note 155.
261. See supra note 156.
262. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BOYCOTT PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
(MAR. 1979) [hereinafter TREASURY, FIRST REPORT (1979)]; SECOND ANNUAL REPORT
(DEC. 1980); THIRD REPORT (MAY 1982); FOURTH REPORT (APR. 1985) [hereinafter TREAS-
URY, FOURTH REPORT (1985).]
263. TREASURY, FIRST REPORT (1979), supra note 262, at 9.
264. TREASURY, FOURTH REPORT (1985), supra note 262, at 9.
265. See TREASURY, FIRST REPORT (1979), supra note 262 at 9.
266. See TREASURY, FOURTH REPORT (1985), supra note 262 at 9.
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information, however, reported about the nature of the amendments to
returns resulting from these audits, making it impossible to learn the fre-
quency or nature of the violations uncovered by the IRS.
In calculating their foreign tax benefits, taxpayers impose the penal-
ties on themselves in accordance with the provisions of Section 999. The
Treasury reports indicate that by the taxpayers' calculations, relatively
few firms lost tax benefits based on their compliance with boycott re-
quests for participation. In 1978, 146 firms reported a reduction in tax
benefits,2 67 the highest total reported, while eighty-seven firms indicated
such reductions for 1982, the last year in which data was reported.268
Comparing the Commerce and Treasury report figures is difficult
because of the dissimilarities in the laws. Comparison is possible and
useful, however, with regard to one particular type of boycott request.
The result indicates potentially significant shortfalls in Treasury report-
ing and compliance. Both the EAA (Commerce) and IRC (Treasury)
provisions restrict agreements not to ship goods on blacklisted vessels.
Although many of the boycotting countries adopted new shipping docu-
mentation language designed to meet this objection, Treasury never ac-
cepted the phraseology.269 Commerce, conversely, not only accepted the
language as permissible, but in mid-1982 it eliminated requests for the
language from its required reports.27 ° It is interesting to isolate and re-
view the totals for these requests for both agencies in their reports for
1982. Commerce records show 21,439 such requests for the three-
quarters of the year they were required to be reported. 271 Treasury
records show only 6,547 such requests reported for the entire year,27 2 out
267. TREASURY, FOURTH REPORT (1985), supra note 262, at 14 (Table 3).
268. Id.
269. See supra notes 239-40.
270. 47 Fed. Reg. 38,501 (1982) (codified at 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a)(5)(viii), (ix) (1986)). The
reporting requirement for these requests was dropped primarily because of the large numbers
of reports they caused. In fiscal year 1981, for example, 17,888 of these requests were re-
ported, approximately 36% of the total number of reported requests. OFFICE OF EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1981 90 [hereinafter EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1981]. In fiscal year 1982, 20,948 requests, also 36% of the total,
were reported. OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINIS-
TRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 1982 86 [hereinafter EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1982]. Total requests for
1983, the first year after the reporting requirement was eliminated, dropped 35% from 1982.
OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1983 86 [hereinafter EXPORT ADMIN-
ISTRATION REPORT 1983].
271. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1982, supra note 270, at 86.
272. TREASURY, FOURTH REPORT (1985), supra note 262, at 16 (Table 5).
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of a total of only 15,072 boycott requests for the year.27 3 The Treasury
Department itself acknowledged this discrepancy in its fourth report,
and indicated that these requests were a particular focus of audit
activity.274
The value of the Treasury enforcement information is restricted by
the limitations existing in the law itself. The penalties of Section 999
apply solely to those taxpayers claiming the enumerated tax benefits.
Thus, figures on compliance with, or enforcement of, its provisions indi-
cate the extent of implementation of the tax policy embodied in the pro-
vision, namely denying these tax benefits for boycott participation. This
data sheds little light, however, on the implementation of the broader
U.S. antiboycott policy.
C. Commerce Department Enforcement
Unlike the Treasury rules, the EAA antiboycott provisions cover
the full range of American participation in the Arab boycott. In eight
years of active enforcement of the law (1979 to 1986), however, the Com-
merce Department has primarily focused on enforcement of its reporting
rules and the bans on level-one and level-two participation. Notwith-
standing this fact, Commerce's record has been described as aggressive
by both advocates and critics of the law.275 More significantly, while
focusing on lower levels of boycott participation, enforcement has effec-
tively limited the inroads on United States sovereignty that the Arab boy-
cott had been making.
Approximately 275 persons have been charged by the Department
of Commerce for violations of the EAA antiboycott rules through fiscal
273. Id.
274. Id. at 9.
275. Will Maslow, the general counsel of the American Jewish Congress, praised the en-
forcement efforts of Commerce's Office of Antiboycott Compliance in a paper presented to a
1984 Brussels seminar on the Arab boycott sponsored by the World Jewish Congress. The
paper was subsequently published. Maslow, The Antiboycott Laws: A Success Story, AMERI-
CAN JEWISH CONG. MONTHLY 8 (Nov. 1984). Lionel Olmer, the Undersecretary of Com-
merce for International Trade, observed in 1983 that he had enforced the antiboycott law
through "draconian" measures to give the Reagan administration credibility to change the
law. Export Administration Act Renewal, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 82, 84-85 (Oct. 18, 1983).
Undersecretary Olmer's views on the enforcement of the antiboycott law, however, changed.
In 1984, at the invitation of the American Jewish organizations, he attended the World Jewish
Congress seminar on the boycott and "described with pride the efforts of his office to enforce
the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Act." Anti-Boycott Conference Held
in Brussels, BOYCOTT REPORT 7, 8 (July-Aug. 1984). Upon his return from that meeting,
Olmer authorized an increase in the staff of the Office of Antiboycott Compliance. Commerce!
Treasury Enforcement, 7 BoYcoTT L. BULL. 3 (Dec. 1984) ("OAC staff to increase to 32 with
new staffers devoted to substantive' violations").
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year 1986.276 Over $5 million in civil fines have been imposed against
these persons, and seven have had their export privileges suspended.277
In addition to these actions, thousands of other persons have received
various kinds of warnings and notices from the Department about possi-
ble violations.27 The Department has made the law a factor to be reck-
oned with in trade with the boycotting countries. It is profitable to
follow the evolution of this policy.
It was not until August 1979 that the Department first took action
to enforce the new law. Commerce announced that Finagrain Compa-
gnie Commerciale Agricole et Financiere, S.A. (Finagrain), a Swiss sub-
sidiary of Continental Grain Company, had entered into a consent
agreement with the Department, agreeing to pay a fine of $20,000 for two
alleged violations of the regulations relating to a shipment to Iraq.
279
The company had certified to the government of Iraq that it was not
affiliated with any blacklisted firms and that the shipment was not of
Israeli origin. The fine imposed was the maximum civil penalty.
2 0
This first consent agreement involved elements that would fre-
quently reappear in enforcement proceedings. The company brought the
violations to the Department's attention through the filing of required
boycott request reports.281 The infractions were statements routinely re-
quired by the letter of credit used to finance the sale.282 In the settlement
276. These totals were compiled from enforcement data provided by the United States De-
partment of Commerce in the Export Administration Reports for 1979-1985 see supra notes
72, 241, and 270; see also BUREAU OF EAsT-WEST TRADE, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 119TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
REPORT 14 (Oct. 1978 - Mar. 1979) [hereinafter 119TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT];
BUREAU OF EAST-WEST TRADE, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 120TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 14 (Apr.-Sept.
1979) [hereinafter 120TH EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT]. The 1986 data has been pub-
lished in Fenton, Commerce Department Antiboycott Activity-Fiscal Year 1986, 3 Int'l Boycotts
(Bus. Laws Inc.) 3851, 3853 (1987).
277. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORTS for 1979-1985, supra notes 72, 241, 270, and
276.
278. For example, during fiscal year 1982, the Commerce Department entered into 43 for-
mal consent agreements and issued eight warning letters for antiboycott violations after full
investigations. Based on the Department's automated boycott report processing system, how-
ever, 439 warning letters and approximately 2,500 "notice" letters were sent to firms for poten-
tial reporting violations. Thus well over 3,000 different United States firms received some kind
of notice of possible infraction from the department during that year. EXPORT ADMINISTRA-
TION REPORT 1982, supra note 276, at 68.
279. In re Finagrain Compagnie Commerciale Agricole et Financiere, 4 Int'l Boycotts
(Bus. Laws Inc.) 3411 (1979).
280. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (maximum civil fine of $10,000 per
violation).
281. Finagrain, 4 Int'l Boycotts at 3411 (charging letter, para. 4).
282. The following statements appeared on the same invoice for the same transaction: (1)
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agreement the company neither admitted nor denied the violations, but
was required to implement an internal compliance program and report to
the Department on its efforts.2 83 The absence of admission and the re-
quirement of an internal compliance program became staples of the con-
sent agreements reached by the Department over the full range of
violations. The maximum civil fine of $10,000 per violation, however,
did not.
The very next case demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining consent
agreements for the maximum civil fine for violations that were mechani-
cal and routine in nature. Cameron Iron Works, Inc.284 reported the
receipt of a number of requests for negative certificates of origin to the
Department and indicated that the company had complied with the re-
quests. An investigation revealed that the company had provided the
same statement on 131 separate occasions.285 The fact that many of
them were a result of documents prepared by automated equipment that
had not been reprogrammed to eliminate the offending statement
28 6
demonstrated that these were truly routine violations characteristic of
level-one participation.
While there was a stronger element of inadvertence in these viola-
tions, they were in substance identical to the Finagrain violations.28 7 In
trying to reach a settlement with Cameron, the Department had to re-
treat substantially from its maximum fine per violation position, because
it became readily apparent that the company would not willingly pay
$1.3 million for these largely mechanical violations. The Department,
however, decided to continue to treat each statement as a separate viola-
tion, and initially sought a per violation fine that was less than the maxi-
mum, but sufficiently high to put the total penalty into six figures.288
The company refused to consider such large per violation penalties.
Some difficult negotiations ensued. The Department was confronted
"[T]he producer is not a branch or a mother company of firms included in the Israel boycott
blacklist"; and (2) "[T]he goods ... do not comprise any parts, materials, labor or capital of
Israeli origin . I. " d.
283. Id. at 3413.
284. In re Cameron Iron Works, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3414 (1979).
285. Id.
286. The consent agreement included: "c. Cameron shall remove from the data bank of the
Billing Department's data processing equipment the negative statement in question." Id. at
3416.
287. The language in question in Cameron Iron Works was: "We hereby certify this in-
voice is true and correct and that the goods enumerated herein are of United States origin. We
hereby certify that the goods enumerated in this invoice are not of Israeli origin nor do they
contain any Israeli materials and are not being exported from Israel." Id. at 3414.
288. The author was the principal negotiator for the Commerce Department.
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with a critical decision at this point. It had to choose between litigation
with the company to obtain a higher penalty, or accepting a relatively
low per violation fine that would likely become a precedent for future
settlements. The Department ultimately determined that a low per viola-
tion fine for infractions of this nature would not detract from the credi-
bility of the enforcement effort, especially when the total fine for the
company would be over $60,000. Thus, a settlement was finally reached
with Cameron for $500 per violation.2 89 This level of penalty for routine,
documentary violations of the statute became the basis for future consent
agreements, reducing the Finagrain fine to an historic anomaly.
The $500 fine per violation was applied to two other types of viola-
tions in a series of related settlements shortly after Cameron in 1980.
Based on reports received from Kintetsu World Express, Inc., a freight
forwarder, Kintetsu,2 9° three of its exporter customers,291 and another
forwarder,2 92 were investigated and discovered to have furnished illegal,
boycott-related shipping certifications and to have failed to file required
boycott request reports. The prohibited statements included negative
certificates of origin and statements relating to the blacklist status of
other firms.2 93 Ironically, Kintetsu was the only firm that elected not to
settle the matter and was formally charged with a violation of the new
statute.294
The Kintetsu case was not decided until July 1981.295 By that time
the narrow range of $500 to $1,000 per violation for routine infractions
was firmly established.2 96 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in
289. In re Cameron Iron Works, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3416, 3416 (1979).
290. In re Kintetsu World Express, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3423 (1980).
291. In re Wilson Indus., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3425 (1980); In re Daiichi
Jitsugyo (America), 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3431 (1980); In re Nissho-Iwai Ameri-
can, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3435 (1980).
292. In re Nippon Express U.S.A., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3429 (1980).
293. Nippon Express U.S.A., an air freight forwarder, provided the statement: "We
hereby certify that the aircraft carrying the merchandise is not on any Arab Boycott List and is
not prohibited from entering any Arab territory." Id.
294. Kintetsu, 4 Int'l Boycotts at 3423 (charging letter). The statements at issue were actu-
ally placed on the documents by Kintetsu on behalf of its exporter clients. A question existed
under the statute about charging exporters for actions taken on their behalf by a freight for-
warder. This question of attributed culpability was never raised, however, because the three
exporters settled. The firm with the weakest argument in its defense, Kintetsu, chose to
litigate.
295. Id. at 3424.1 (initial decision of Administrative Law Judge).
296. See EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1980, supra note 72, at 74-76; EXPORT AD-
MINISTRATION REPORT 1981, supra note 276, at 78-81 (listings of consent agreements, viola-
tions, and fines for antiboycott violations).
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Kintetsu, however, imposed a fine of $5,000 per violation for illegal nega-
tive certificates of origin and failures to report.
His analysis of the law and its penalty provisions differed markedly
from that of the Office of Antiboycott Compliance, which had only re-
quested a penalty of $2,000 per violation.297 The ALJ explained that
$5,000, as the midpoint in the penalty range, was where every determina-
tion should begin, with movement up or down depending on mitigating
or aggravating factors.2 98 While there were some mitigating factors,
Kintetsu's status as an exporting professional imposed upon it a heavy
obligation to be familiar with the rules applicable to the export trade.299
The firm appealed the decision within the Department, and in 1982 the
Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration upheld the decision; he re-
duced the penalty, however, from $5,000 to $3,500 per violation.
In the only other case litigated in the early enforcement effort, the
Department brought charges against Core Laboratories, Inc., in 1979.301
These charges were based primarily on statements placed on shipping
documents through use of a rubber stamp bearing a statement that the
company had no connections with Israel. The ALJ imposed a penalty of
$3,000 for each of these routine violations.30 2 This penalty was upheld
by the Assistant Secretary.30 3 The company, however, ultimately es-
caped liability because the statute of limitations had expired.3 4
While there had not been a great deal of interest in litigating an-
tiboycott matters before the Kintetsu or Core decisions, the huge dispar-
ity in the amounts of the fines accepted by the Department in consent
agreements and the amounts imposed by the ALJ undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the very small number of antiboycott cases brought to
litigation.30 5
297. See ALJ Sets First Antiboycott Fine: $130,000 for 26 Charges, 5 BoYcoTT L. BULL. 8
(July 1981). The Department sought the $2,000 penalty from the ALJ to distinguish sharply
the $500 penalty it had sought in negotiations with the company.
298. In re Kintetsu World Express, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3423, 3424.6 (1980).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 3424.8, 3424.9 (1982) (notice of decision).
301. In re Core Laboratories, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3417 (1979) (charging
letter).
302. Id. at 3417.21 (1982) (initial decision on remand of Administrative Law Judge).
303. Id. at 3417.23 (1983) (decision on appeal), 3417.33 (1983) (order).
304. United States v. Core Laboratories, Inc., No. 3-54-09 51-C (N.D. Tex. July 24, 1984)
reprinted in 4 Int'l Boycotts 3417.41 (1985) (dismissing the Department's action to collect the
fine), aff'd 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985).
305. During the first four years of active enforcement by the Department (1980-1983), 126
firms entered into consent agreements while only 15 were formally charged. Of the 15
charged, eight ultimately settled. Thus, only seven of 141 firms chose to litigate with the
Department. See EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1980, supra note 72, at 74; EXPORT
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Not all of the consent agreements in the first year of active Com-
merce Department enforcement involved routine, documentary level-one
violations. In the first two level-two participation cases, the Department
began to change the amount of penalty based on its perception of the
seriousness of the infraction. In the first case, the Department formally
charged Library Bureau, Inc. with agreeing to refuse to do business pur-
suant to a boycott-related requirement,3" 6 but the parties elected to settle
before the matter went to the ALl. The fine agreed upon was the maxi-
mum of $10,000, although half of the fine was suspended because of the
perilous financial condition of the firm.307 In the second case, Pace
Company Consultants & Engineers, Inc. settled allegations that it had
provided a specific assurance to a boycotting country customer that it did
not deal with Israel, for a fine of $5,000. The Department sought this
high penalty for furnishing information because the violation arose in the
context of corporate officials soliciting a business opportunity rather than
the clerical preparation of shipping documents, 30 8 an excellent example
of the distinction between level-one and level-two boycott participation.
In 1981, the second year of active antiboycott enforcement, the
number of level-two enforcement actions increased substantially and sig-
nificant enforcement activity for violations of the reporting rules com-
menced. The Department settled its first religious information case for
the maximum fine,3 09 took action against attorneys for the first time in
trademark registration violations, 310 and settled with three companies
that had agreed to refuse to deal with blacklisted firms.311
These early cases illustrate the nature of level-two participation,
midway between routine documentary compliance and active discrimina-
tion against a person or country. For example, in one case the religious
information was provided gratuitously in a statement that the company's
principals were all Muslim, along with responses to a standard boycott
ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1981, supra note 270, at 76; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT
1982, supra note 270, at 68; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1983, supra note 270, at 74,
75.
306. In re Library Bureau, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3421 (1979).
307. See Antiboycott Enforcement Threatens Library Bureau's Export Hopes, 4 BoYcoT-r L.
BULL. 38 (1980).
308. In re Pace Co., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3441 (1980).
309. In re Zamilco Int'l, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3447 (1980).
310. In re Marmorek, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Law Inc.) 3456.5 (1981); In re Meyer, 4 Int'l
Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3458.1 (1981).
311. In re LaPine Scientific Co., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3455.2 (1981); In re AE
Div., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3458.3 (1981); In re CSC Scientific Co., 4 INT'L Boy-
coTrs (Bus. LAWS INC.) 3460 (1981).
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questionnaire.312 In another case, certain agreements to refuse to deal
were the result of submitting bids in response to invitations to bid that
prohibited bids on equipment produced by blacklisted firms. 313 In yet
another case, the violations committed by attorneys involved responses
to a standard boycott questionnaire formerly required to register trade-
marks in Arab countries.31 4
The most publicized case during 1981 was the settlement with the
3M Company, three of its domestic subsidiaries, and six of its foreign
subsidiaries. 3 5  The $137,500 penalty was the largest fine to date in an
antiboycott case. It was, however, the result of 230 routine reporting and
documentary furnishing information violations, simple level-one par-
ticipation.
The 3M case was significant for another reason. Two of the coun-
tries in which the subsidiaries were located, Italy3 6 and the United
Kingdom, expressed displeasure over the application of the EAA an-
tiboycott provisions to firms that they regarded as their nationals. In a
formal exchange of diplomatic notes with the United States State Depart-
ment, the United Kingdom expressed its concern over the basis for the
United States extraterritorial claim to jurisdiction over 3M's United
Kingdom subsidiary, describing it as "the kind of economic coercion in
regard to other countries which the regulations were designed to pre-
312. Zamilco, 4 Int'l Boycotts 3447 (charging letter).
313. See e.g., CSC Scientific, 4 Int'l Boycotts 3460, 3461 (1981) (charging letter). The
particular language in the invitations responded to by CSC was "do not quote on goods manu-
factured by companies who are included in the Arab Boycott list, i.e. (BLACKLIST)." Id.
The Department took the position that submitting a bid without taking exception to that con-
dition constituted an agreement to accept it as a condition on the bid. But see Marcuss &
Tykocinski, The CSC Scientific Settlement: When is an Example a Rule?, 5 BoycoTT L.
BULL. I (Oct. 1981).
314. See supra note 249. One of the attorneys, Robert E. Meyer, chose to litigate the mat-
ter and suffered decisions against him by the Department's AL, 4 Int'l Boycotts 3458.24, and
on appeal by the assistant secretary, id. at 3458.281 (1984). Meyer refused to pay the fine, and
was sued by the Department in 1985. United States v. Meyer, No. 85-4798-T (D. Mass.)
reprinted in 4 Int'l Boycotts 3458.281 (1987), rev'd 808 F.2d 912 (lst Cir. 1987). The District
Court dismissed the action on statute of limitations grounds, citing United States v. Core Lab-
oratories, No. 3-54-09 51-G (N.D. Tex. July 24, 1984), reprinted in 4 Int'l Boycotts 3417.41,
aff'd 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985). The First Circuit reversed, choosing to disagree with the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Core.
315. In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3450.4 (1980).
The countries in which the subsidiaries were located were Italy, France, Belgium, West Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Id.
316. A representative of the Italian embassy met informally with Commerce Department
officals, including the author, to express the Italian government's concern over subjecting the
Italian subsidiary, 3M Italia S.P.A., to United States jurisdiction.
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vent" in the United States.317 While the 3M case resulted in no further
action by the United States or the United Kingdom, enforcement of the
antiboycott provisions against United Kingdom subsidiaries of American
firms continued to be a sensitive matter.31 8
Nineteen eighty-two marked a dramatic change in the enforcement
program at the Department, with four significant first impression actions.
In the first of the level-three participation charges brought by the De-
partment, two companies were charged with actual refusals to do busi-
ness. In addition, banks were the subject of consent agreements for the
first time, the denial of export privileges penalty was used for the first
time, and the first charge of evading the prohibitions of the statute was
levelled by the Department.
The Department brought the charges for boycott-based refusals to
do business against an insurance broker, Northstar Brokerage Corpora-
tion,3 19 and a freight forwarder, Albert E. Bowen, Inc.320 The violations
grew out of the same transaction and involved the placement of insur-
ance through a foreign firm after American firms refused to provide a
statement that they were not blacklisted.321 Bowen agreed to settle for
$7,500 per violation,322 while Northstar was formally charged.323 High-
lighting the complexity and confusion surrounding the law, the same
ALJ who had fined the freight forwarder Kintetsu $5,000 for its routine
violations, fined Northstar $50 for its refusal to deal.324
Banks active in the Middle East historically have accounted for the
largest number of boycott reports filed with the Department,325 but were
not the object of enforcement activity until 1982. During that fiscal year,
six banks326 entered into consent agreements, accounting for $140,000 in
317. A. LOWE supra note 198, at 154 (reprinting portion of British note No. 174, Sept. 4,
1981).
318. In at least one other matter, an attorney for an American firm with a United Kingdom
subsidiary met with Commerce Department officials, including the author, to indicate that the
United Kingdom subsidiary had been threatened with invocation of the British Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, to prevent it from responding to Department requests for
information. The Department ultimately terminated the investigation with no action.
319. In re North Star Brokerage, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3478 (1982).
320. In re Albert E. Bowen, Inc., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3481.3 (1982).
321. North Star Brokerage, 4 Int'l Boycotts at 3478-3478.1 (charging letter).
322. Albert E. Bowen, 4 Int'l Boycotts at 3481.6.
323. North Star Brokerage, 4 Int'l Boycotts at 3478.1 (charging letter).
324. Id. at 3478.2, 3479 (initial decision).
325. See, e.g., EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1980, supra note 72, at 80. Banks re-
ported 19,912 boycott requests, 52% of the total of the 37,737 requests reported for the year.
Id.
326. In re Marine Midland Bank, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3485.3 (1982); In re
State Street Bank & Trust Co., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3486.12 (1982); In re Conti-
1987]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
fines. While the majority of the violations were failures to report, two of
the banks were found to have implemented letters of credit with prohib-
ited boycott provisions. 327 The Department obtained the maximum civil
penalty of $10,000 for each of these level-two violations, placing them in
the Department's category of most serious infractions. In November of
1982, the Department obtained its largest fine to that date, $189,000,
from Philadelphia International Bank for 220 separate reporting
infractions.328
The year 1982 also marked the Department's first use of the denial
of the export privileges penalty. Columbia Pictures (Columbia) 329 and
Xerox Corporation (Xerox) 330 both agreed to a suspension of their ex-
port privileges to countries in the Middle East for six months. The exact
violations were somewhat different but the circumstances of the two
cases were very similar. Xerox was on the blacklist and was charged by
the Department with agreeing to furnish information to the boycott au-
thorities to facilitate its removal from the blacklist. Columbia was
threatened with blacklisting because of its suspected relationship to Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Systems (CBS), which was already blacklisted. Co-
lumbia allegedly provided information to boycotting authorities
renouncing any relationship with CBS. Columbia agreed to the suspen-
sion, along with the maximum civil monetary fine of $10,000 for the vio-
lation. Xerox initially sought to litigate its case, but ultimately settled for
the suspension and maximum fine before the matter could be decided by
an ALl.
The export suspension penalty is the most severe penalty available
to the Department for antiboycott violations. While the statute provides
for criminal sanctions,33' the higher standard of proof and administrative
complications involved in going through the Justice Department and of-
fices of the United States Attorney weigh against extensive use of crimi-
nal sanctions. Furthermore, the economic impact of an extended
suspension of export privileges for a firm heavily engaged in foreign busi-
nental Bank Int'l, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3490.72 (1982); In re Wells Fargo Bank, 4
Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3490.79 (1982); In re UBAF Arab-American Bank, 4 Int'l
Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3490.84 (1982); In re Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 4 Int'l Boycotts
(Bus. Laws Inc.) 3491.47 (1982).
327. Marine Midland Bank, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3485.3 (1982); UBAF Arab-
American Bank, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3490.84 (1982).
328. In re Philadelphia Int'l Bank, 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3491.04 (1982).
329. In re Columbia Pictures Indus., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3490.92 (1983).
330. In re Xerox Corp., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3485.8 (1982) (charging letter); 5
Int'l Boycotts 3492.59 (1984) (consent agreement).
331. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a), (b) (1985).
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ness outweighs even the maximum criminal fine. In these first two cases,
however, the impact of the suspension was minimal. Xerox did virtually
no business in the region because of its blacklist status. Columbia's sus-
pension was limited to Jordan,332 a relatively tiny market for its
products.
Notwithstanding the small economic impact, the Department im-
posed the denial penalty in these two cases for two reasons. First, the
Department sought to establish the precedent of use of the sanction for
boycott violations. Because the antiboycott provisions of the EAA dif-
fered significantly from the main thrust of the Act, which was the control
of United States exports, some question existed about the willingness of
the Department to use the suspension penalty for antiboycott viola-
tions.333 Indeed, there was some sentiment within the Department
against use of the denial penalty because antiboycott violations generally
were not perceived to be as serious as export control violations33a and did
not justify such a severe penalty. Use of these sanctions showed the will-
ingness of the Department to use all available enforcement tools at its
disposal. Second, and in part because of the perceived initial reluctance
to use the penalty, the suspensions strongly emphasized the importance
which the Department attached to violations committed in an effort to
fend off blacklisting or to be removed from the blacklist.
The final enforcement "first" for the Department in 1982 was of a
much more ambiguous character. The Export Administration Regula-
tions prohibit any actions taken "with intent to evade" the antiboycott
provisions. 335 The scope of this provision is unclear,336 but 1982 saw the
first, and through 1986, only, evasion charge. Wallace Silversmiths337
allegedly provided prohibited information to another person, and then
asked that person to pass the information along to boycotting authorities
because Wallace Silversmiths was prohibited from doing so by the an-
tiboycott law. The Department charged Wallace Silversmiths with fur-
332. Columbia Pictures, 4 Int'l Boycotts at 3491, 3492 (consent agreement). The suspen-
sion technically applied to nine countries where Columbia did business, but was suspended for
all but Jordan, the country in which the violation occurred.
333. Congress indicated that it wanted the export suspension penalty used for antiboycott
violations. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 50. The statute expressly states
that the penalty is available for antiboycott violations. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)(2)(A) (1986).
334. The author participated extensively in the decision to impose the export suspension
penalty.
335. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(a) (1985).
336. See Ludwig & Smith, The Business Effects of the Antiboycott Provisions of the Export
Administration Amendments of 1977- Morality Plus Pragmatism Equals Complexity, 8 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 581, 630-34 (1978).
337. In re Wallace Silversmiths, Inc., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3491.64 (1982).
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nishing the information and with evasion based on the request to have
the information passed along.33 8 The firm agreed to pay the maximum
civil fine for the evasion charge.339
The enforcement patterns established in 1982 continued in increas-
ing numbers in 1983 and 1984.34  No cases were brought in either 1983
or 1984 that involved level-three violations of discrimination against per-
sons based on their religion or blacklist status. While the suspension of
export privilege penalty was employed in two other cases in 1984,34' only
two 1983 or 1984 charging letters reflected unusual enforcement actions.
Both of these related to responses to blacklist pressure from the Arab
boycotting countries and involved level-two violations by "United States
persons" acting to aid in the administration or enforcement of the
boycott.
The first action highlighted continuing confusion and frustration
over the furnishing information prohibitions of the Act. House Repre-
sentative Stewart McKinney of Connecticut was charged with furnishing
information about the relationship of one of his constituents with a
blacklisted company.342 The constituent had apparently approached
McKinney after an unsuccessful effort to deal with a potential blacklist-
ing by an Arab country based on misidentification of an affiliate of the
company. The matter was ultimately settled without a penalty. 43
The other significant furnishing information case brought in 1984
involved information furnished in a successful effort to remove a com-
pany from the blacklist. Bunker Ramo Eltra Corporation was charged
with 120 separate violations of furnishing information about business re-
lationships and about relationships with charitable or fraternal organiza-
tions. 34 The case was based on an apparent campaign by the company
to get off of the blacklist. The campaign included the preparation of de-
tailed letters about past dealings of the company and some of the com-
338. Id.
339. Id. at 3491.7.
340. In fiscal year 1983, the Department concluded 53 consent agreements, imposing ap-
proximately $1.4 million in fines. Four companies were formally charged. EXPORT ADMINIS-
TRATION REPORT 1983, supra note 276, at 81. In fiscal 1984 the totals rose to 59 consent
agreements, 6 charging letters and approximately $1.6 million in fines. EXPORT ADMINISTRA-
TION REPORT 1983, supra note 276, at 83.
341. In re C.S. Greene & Co., Inc., 5 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3493.65 (1983) (for
violations committed while under prior consent agreement with the department); In re King
Trading, 5 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3495.23 (1984) (for furnishing information to avoid
blacklisting).
342. In re McKinney, 5 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3494.20 (1984).
343. Id.
344. In re Bunker Ramo Eltra Corp., 5 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3496.5301 (1984).
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pany's former owners. This matter continued in litigation through
1986.34s
In 1985, there was an overall decline in the number of enforcement
actions and amount of fines imposed. The Office of Antiboycott Compli-
ance, however, did bring two series of actions for religious discrimina-
tion, the first significant level-three cases brought under the law. In
January 1985 the Commerce Department announced that Lockheed En-
gineering & Management Services Co., Inc. (LEMSCO), 34 6 and a consult-
ant to the company, Frank Forsberg,347 had entered into separate
consent agreements and agreed to certain penalties. The action arose out
of allegations that LEMSCO, through its consultant Forsberg, had re-
fused to consider Jewish applicants for positions with the company in
Saudi Arabia. LEMSCO agreed to pay the maximum civil fine of
$10,000, accepted a one year denial of its export privileges to the fourteen
boycotting countries in the Middle East, and admitted that it had failed
properly to supervise Forsberg.3.8 Forsberg, who admitted that he, in
fact, had discriminated against applicants based on their religion, ac-
cepted the same penalties as LEMSCO. 319
While this was the first action brought by the Commerce Depart-
ment for discrimination under the EAA, it was not the first determina-
tion of such a violation under the Act. In March of 1984, a United States
district court judge found Baylor Medical Center (Baylor) guilty of vio-
lating the discrimination provision of the EAA in a private lawsuit
brought by a former member of the Baylor medical staff.350 The judge
ruled that the doctor could claim a private right of action under the
EAA,35 1 distinguishing a New York federal court decision finding that
345. The case involves two important issues for the Commerce Department: the extent to
which it can charge multiple violations for the furnishing information prohibition in a single
document, and the statute of limitations applicable to antiboycott enforcement actions. In
1985, the Department's charges were dismissed by the ALU on procedural and statute of limi-
tations grounds. Bunker Ramo Eltra, 5 Int'l Boycotts at 3496.5309, in accordance with the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Core Laboratories, 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir.
1985). The Department appealed the decision to the assistant secretary. See Commerce Seeks
Reversal in Bunker Ramo Eltra Case on Procedural Grounds, While BRE Presses Statute of
Limitations Issue, 9 BoYcoTr L. BULL. 4 (Dec. 1985).
346. In re Lockheed Eng'g & Management Servs. Co., 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.)
3497.01 (1985).
347. In re Forsberg, 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.06 (1985).
348. Lockheed, 2 Int'l Boycotts at 3497.03 (consent agreement).
349. Forsberg, 2 Int'l Boycotts at 3497.08 (consent agreement).
350. Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd 805
F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986).
351. Id. at 1580-82.
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the EAA does not create a private right of action.352 In June of 1985,
the Department issued formal charging letters against Baylor and two of
its staff doctors for violating the discrimination provisions of the Act,
based on the same transactions which were the subject of the federal
court action.353 The matter settled in late 1985 (fiscal 1986) when Baylor
and the two doctors agreed to pay civil penalties of $35,000 and to take
rigorous steps to prevent a recurrence.354
The Commerce Department enforcement effort for fiscal year 1986
showed continued decline in both the number of consent agreements and
total fines imposed, resulting in the lowest totals since 198 1.355 There
were only 32 different parties involved with a total of $390,500 in fines
imposed.356 Three of these consent agreements involved allegations of
religious discrimination, level-three violations 7.3 5  The others were fairly
evenly divided among reporting, level-one, and level-two 358 type infrac-
tions. The amount of fines imposed was lower than it might have been
because the Department chose not to impose penalties for reporting vio-
lations on a per- violation basis in four cases.359 In one of those cases, the
Department settled 245 separate failures to file required reports for one
$10,000 penalty.360 The director of the Department's Office of An-
352. Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G. v. Sun Co., 583 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 742 F.2d
1431 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 129 (1984).
353. In re Baylor College of Medicine, 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.44 (1985); In
re Dean H. Morrow, M.D., 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.45 (1985); In re Storey, 2
Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.46 (1985).
354. Id. at 3497.48-3497.49 (combined consent agreement).
355. In that year 21 firms were involved in consent agreements or charges, and penalties of
$384,500 were imposed. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1981, supra note 276, at 82.
356. See Fenton, Commerce Department Antiboycott Activity-Fiscal Year 1986, supra note
276, at 3851. The total firms involved FY 1986 appears in that article as 36, but that includes
the cases against Baylor Medical Center and its two doctors, which are counted as 1985 cases
in this analysis based on the date of the charging letters. See supra notes 353-54 and accompa-
nying text.
357. In re Planning Research Corp., 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.51 (1986); In re
General Devices, Inc., 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.94 (1986); In re Nigel Martin-
Jones, 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.90 (1986).
358. One consent agreement with Hach Company included an alleged refusal to deal with a
blacklisted firm, a level-three violation. The charge, however, was based on a shipment con-
temporaneous with a certification that "goods... will not be transported by any vessel stated
on the blacklist .... In re Hach Company, 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.72, 3497.75
(1986). This infraction is typical of level-two agreements to refuse to deal and does not involve
any actual discrimination against another person.
359. See, e.g., In re Troy Trading Co., 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.81 (1986); In
re Kaiser Int'l Corp., 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3498.01 (1986).
360. In re Gulf Int'l Bank, B.S.C., 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3498 (1986). Contrast
this to the $323,000 fine paid by Citibank for its 337 failures to report. In re Citibank, N.A., 5
Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3492.48 (1983).
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tiboycott Compliance defended the recent decline in enforcement totals
by stating that the office was devoting its limited resources to the more
difficult-to-prove violations, the level-three blacklist and religious dis-
crimination, and the level-four refusal-to-deal-with-Israel cases.3 61
D. Summarizing Commerce Department Enforcement
The Department's enforcement actions in the first seven years of ac-
tivity overwhelmingly emphasized reporting infractions and routine doc-
umentary violations. Table 3 represents the analysis of all of the
Commerce Department enforcement actions from 1979 through 1986 in
terms of the four levels of boycott participation and enforcement of the
EAA reporting requirements.
Each consent agreement or charging letter was categorized based on
the highest level violation alleged. Thus the reporting violation category
contains only those enforcement actions involving simple reporting viola-
tions, while the level-two category may include enforcement actions in-
volving reporting violations, routine level-one documentary violations, as
well as level-two participation violations.
Through 1985, the Department made 275 consent agreements or
formal charges and imposed approximately five million dollars in civil
fines. It is readily apparent that there was a huge preponderance of activ-
ity involving the reporting violations. The next largest category is almost
evenly divided between level-one and level-two activity, while level-three
actions were minimal. There were no enforcement actions for level-four
violations.
Considering the relative proportions of enforcement activity, there
were only ten level-three actions, comprising less than four percent of the
total number. Two of these involved discrimination against blacklisted
firms, 362 while eight involved discrimination based on religion. 36 3
361. See Eisler, 'Pariah' Boycott Office Lacks Muscle, Legal Times Wash., Dec. 15, 1986 at
10, col. 4.
362. Albert E. Bowen Inc., 4 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3481.3 (1982); Northstar
Brokerage, Inc., 4 Int'l Boycotts 3478 (1982).
363. In re Lockheed Eng'g & Management Servs. Co., 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.)
3497.01 (1985); In re Forsberg, 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.06 (1985); In re Baylor
College of Medicine, 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.44 (1985); In re Morrow, 2 Int'l
Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.45 (1985); In re Storey, 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.)
3497.46 (1985); In re Planning Research Corp., 2 Int'l Boycotts, (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.51
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Seventy-six firms were charged with level-two boycott enforcement or
administration violations, comprising approximately twenty-seven per-
cent of the total number of firms charged. Eighty-one out of the 275
actions, or over twenty-nine percent of the consent agreements or
charges brought by the Commerce Department for antiboycott viola-
tions, involved violations of the routine documentary level-one prohibi-
tions. The largest category of enforcement actions involved violations of
the reporting provisions alone. These 109 actions, thirty-nine percent of
the total, also accounted for over forty-five percent of the fines that the
Department imposed during the first seven years of its enforcement
program.
VI. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION
A. Introduction
An assessment of the impact of the United States antiboycott laws
requires consideration of four distinct questions. First, a threshold in-
quiry about the impact of the laws on United States trade with the Arab
boycotting countries is necessary. If the laws substantially reduced
United States trade with the boycotting countries, this would diminish
any effects achieved in limiting the impact of the boycott on the remain-
ing trade.
The second and third questions involve judging the impact of the
antiboycott laws on their articulated objectives. The second question,
then, is whether the laws lessened the impact of the boycott on Israel.
The third question is whether the laws have limited the impact of the
boycott on United States sovereignty. The fourth and final question con-
siders the ancillary impact of the laws on the exercise of the United
States extraterritorial jurisdiction and economic coercion. Following the
discussion of each of these four questions, a view of the complex impact
of the antiboycott laws emerges that permits conclusions to be reached
about their place in the international economic relations of the United
States
B. Impact on United States-Arab Trade
Answers to the trade impact question are available, although some-
what elusive. United States-Arab trade continues to conform to general
economic trends, showing substantial increases in the years after the laws
(1986); In re Martin-Jones, 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.90 (1986); In re General
Devices, Inc., 2 Int'l Boycotts (Bus. Laws Inc.) 3497.94 (1986).
[Vol. 10
U.S. Antiboycott Laws
were adopted and more recent declines as OPEC's fortunes wane.
Compared to European and Japanese success in the markets, there ap-
pears to have been no significant erosion in market-share. 36 On the
other hand, sales have undoubtedly been lost because American firms
could not comply with boycott requirements. 3 " Efforts to quantify these
trade losses have been unsuccessful, however.367 Almost all of the infor-
mation available is anecdotal involving specific losses by individual firms.
Often cited as examples of antiboycott law-related trade losses are
the fate of blacklisted companies. Both the Trane Company and Briggs
& Stratton argued in their lawsuits that they suffered severe trade losses
because the EAA prevented them from providing information to the boy-
cotting authorities that would have caused them to be removed from the
blacklist. 368 The EAA, no doubt, had this effect in some instances, but to
accept this assertion as evidence of widespread trade losses fails to take
into account two other important factors. First, many blacklisted Amer-
ican firms have the kind of economic relationships with Israel that are
the basis for Arab blacklisting. Any trade they have lost is a direct result
of the boycott rather than United States antiboycott laws. Second, it is
364. United States exports to the Arab boycotting countries rose from $6.2 billion in 1977
to a high of $11.8 billion in 1983, dropping to $8.9 billion in 1984. IMF, 1980 YEARBOOK,
supra note 89, at 378 (1977 figures); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF
TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK 400 (1985) [hereinafter IMF, 1985 YEARBOOK] (1978-84
figures).
365. In 1977, the United States sold approximately 13.7% of total world exports to the
boycotting countries, with Japan accounting for 14% and the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) having a 37.8% share. In 1982 the United States share was 13.2%, Japan's was
14.2% and the EEC's 35.8%. IMF, 1980 YEARBOOK, supra note 89, at 378, 222-23, 56, 58
(1977 figures); IMF, 1985 YEARBOOK, supra note 364, at 400, 242, 98 (1978-84 figures).
366. See Campbell, Effects of Peace in the Middle East on Trade with the United States, 12
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 39-43 (1980) (an early effort to identify any trade impact of the
1977 EAA revisions).
367. When a firm is confronted with an illegal boycott demand, the firm may be able to
negotiate the elimination of the prohibited term and proceed with the transaction. The Com-
merce Department reports the total number and dollar value of reported transactions involv-
ing requests for illegal boycott action. The data collected, however, only indicates whether the
boycott demand was complied with, and not the ultimate fate of the transaction. The number
of transactions that at some point involve an illegal request gives at least some indication of the
extent of such demands. For example, 1983 figures show that slightly more than 10% of all
reported transactions included requests for illegal actions (3,686 out of 35,258 reported trans-
actions), but that these transactions accounted for almost 60% of the value of all reported
transactions ($6.9 billion out of $11.4 billion total value). EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT
1983, supra note 276, at 88.
368. See Warden, The Trane Company Sues to Enjoin Enforcement of EAA Provisions, 2
BOYCOTT L. BULL. 201, 202 (1978); Commerce/Treasury Enforcement, 4 BOYCOTT L. BULL.
49, 50 (1980) ("In Trane Case Deposition, Marcuss Discusses Trade Losses Due to An-
tiboycott Enforcement"); Second Constitutional Attack Launched Against EAA and Reg., 4
BoYcoTT L. BULL. 201, 202-03 (1980).
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virtually impossible to know if trade opportunities lost by blacklisted
American firms are consistently lost to foreign competitors or to other
American firms. Many of the Arab customers have a preference for
American products beyond a specific brand loyalty. For purposes of de-
termining impact, only losses to foreign competitors can be considered as
adversely affecting United States trade, and evidence of these losses, as
indicated, is not conclusive.
Another part of the difficulty in assessing the impact of the an-
tiboycott laws on United States-Arab trade is the variety of factors affect-
ing trade between American concerns and the Arab world. These factors
include general problems that the United States has faced in the world
market such as the until recently overvalued dollar and significant lan-
guage and cultural barriers. Another possible negative influence on
United States trade in the region is other trade-restrictive legislation.
Certain provisions of the tax laws and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
have been identified as possibly relevant elements in United States-Arab
trade problems.369
While trade lost due to the conflict between Arab boycott require-
ments and United States laws is the most obvious negative effect of the
laws, it is not the only possible adverse trade effect of the legislation. The
complexity of the regulations and reporting requirements has also been
identified as a problem, particularly for small and medium-sized export-
ers.370 When, in the late 1970s, the United States Trade Representative
and Secretary of Commerce catalogued potential export disincentives for
President Carter, the concurrent application of two distinct antiboycott
regulatory regimes was specifically discussed as a significant barrier to
firms seeking to enter the Middle East market. 371 The areas of disagree-
ment or conflict between the two laws and the resulting confusion were
noted as contributing to reduced trade.372
It is apparent that the antiboycott laws have had some negative ef-
fect on United States trade with the boycotting states. Although the ef-
fect is virtually impossible to quantify, the impact has not been dramatic.
American firms have found ways to accommodate both boycott and an-
tiboycott requirements. The Arab states, moreover, have made numer-
ous concessions in their efforts to maintain trade relations with American
369. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON EXPORT PROMOTION FUNCTIONS AND POTEN-
TIAL EXPORT DISINCENTIVES 8-1, 8-8 to-8-10 (Taxation of Foreign Earned Income), 9-1 to 9-
11 (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982)) (1980).
370. Id. at 9-15.
371. Id. at 9-11, 9-15.
372. Id. at 9-18.
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companies. To the extent that the laws have limited the impact of the
boycott, that effect is undiluted by significantly reduced trade.
C. Impact on Israel
As the 1985 Free Trade Agreement between the United States and
Israel3 73 indicates, the United States is strongly committed to its eco-
nomic, as well as political and military alliance with Israel. The an-
tiboycott laws of 1976 and 1977 were largely the result of efforts to
provide assistance to Israel in combating the effects of the boycott.
While the harmful economic effect of the Arab boycott on Israel has been
measured,37 there is no compelling data available to judge the effect of
the antiboycott laws in offsetting that influence. For example, United
States private investment in Israel has consistently increased since adop-
tion of the laws at a rate significantly higher than that for United States
investment in developed countries as a whole.3 75 United States exports
to Israel have also generally increased since the laws were enacted, and
imports from Israel have increased substantially.3 76 Israeli trade with the
EEC, however, has shown similar increases.377
The antiboycott laws were designed to assist Israel primarily by
preventing American firms from severing trade relations with Israel be-
cause of Arab boycott pressure.378 The laws did not, however, create an
affirmative obligation to trade with Israel; there was merely an obligation
373. Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, United States-Israel, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. -.
This agreement apparently caused the Arab League to consider strengthening their boycott.
See Boycotting Countries' Policies, 9 BoYcOTT L. BULL. 6-8 (July 1985) ("Top Arab League
Official Reveals Tougher Boycott Plans In Response to U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement").
374. D. LOSMAN, supra note 11, at 47-79. Losman found substantial adverse impact on
Israel's economic development as a result of the boycott, although he concluded that it has
been almost totally without political success. Id. at 79.
375. United States private investment in Israel increased at a 14.8% annual rate from 1977
to 1982, from $253 million to $505 million. This is somewhat higher that the annual rate of
increase from 1966 to 1982, which was 13.8%. United States investment in all developed
countries for the period 1977 to 1982 increased at an annual rate of 8.2%. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVEST-
MENT: GLOBAL TRENDS AND THE U.S. ROLE 50-52 (1984).
376. In 1977 United States exports to Israel totalled $981 million and imports totalled $568
million. IMF, 1980 YEARBOOK, supra note 89, at 378. In 1984 United States exports were
$1.6 billion, while imports were $1.61 billion. IMF, 1985 YEARBOOK, supra note 364, at 400.
377. 1977 exports were $1.97 billion, imports from Israel were $1.1 billion. IMF, 1980
YEARBOOK, supra note 89, at 56, 58. 1984 EEC exports to Israel were $3.47 billion while,
imports were $1.87 billion. IMF, 1985 YEARBOOK, supra note 364, at 58.
378. Losman indicates that the boycott may have caused some firms to withdraw from
Israeli trade under Arab pressure. He points out, however, that other firms less susceptible to
boycott pressure would be attracted to the market position abandoned by the boycott partici-
pant. D. LOSMAN, supra note 11, at 66-67.
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not to refrain for boycott reasons. Other provisions of the laws provided
symbolic and moral support against the boycott, but the refusal to deal
provision of the EAA was the main lever.
As discussed above,37 9 the prohibition on refusing to trade with
Israel is the one aspect of illegal boycott participation that the Depart-
ment of Commerce has yet to address through an enforcement action.
Given the difficulties in proving that the reason for an absence of a trade
relationship is the boycott, the lack of enforcement activity is not surpris-
ing. Organizations supporting Israel, however, have continued to raise
legitimate questions about the high profile of some American businesses
in the Arab world and their absence from the Israeli market.38 °
The absence of actions for refusing to do business with Israel in the
seven years of enforcement activity inescapably renders that provision of
the EAA less credible as a deterrent. It cannot be denied that, in the face
of Arab boycott pressure, the antiboycott laws have encouraged some
businesses to begin or continue trade with Israel. Private investment
figures point in this direction, yet there is no way to prove the assump-
tion. Tangible evidence of economic benefits to Israel from United States
antiboycott laws remains inconclusive.
Symbolic benefits to Israel and its supporters, however, should not
be discounted. There is evidence that the antiboycott efforts of the
United States have been appreciated in this ephemeral yet morale-boost-
ing context. 381 This effect, in itself, is a positive result of the laws on
Arab boycott pressure against Israel.
D. Impact on the Extraterritoriality of the Arab Boycott
The antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Act forced
the Arab boycotting states to abandon many of their extraterritorial de-
mands on American firms to participate in the boycott. Arab states
modified their procedures for the first three levels of boycott participa-
tion to reduce the role of American firms in the operation of the boycott.
The Commerce Department followed these Arab state revisions with suf-
ficient enforcement activity at levels one and two to alert the American
business community to the modified rules and maintain pressure on the
Arab states to continue the changes they had implemented.
The nature and extent of the modifications made by the boycotting
379. See supra Table 3 and accompanying text.
380. See, e.g., Why Won't Chase, Citibank Open Branches in Israel?, BoYCoTT REPORT,
(Mar. 1986) at 3 (publication of American Jewish Congress).
381. See Maslow, supra note 274.
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countries have been described above.38 2 The changes have been greatest
with regard to level-one and level-two participation, where the role of the
American firms was the most symbolic and the enforcement effort the
greatest. The most significant extraterritorial demand eliminated by the
law at either of these levels involved United States bank implementation
of letters of credit. The EAA prevented American banks from enforcing
illegal boycott terms in letters of credit opened by boycotting country
banks, thereby preventing American banks from forcing other American
businesses to comply with the boycott. Banks and their letter of credit
practices were an early target of Commerce Department scrutiny. Con-
sidering the relatively small number of enforcement actions against banks
for illegal enforcement of letters of credit with boycott terms, notwith-
standing numerous reporting violations by banks, the EAA ban was ap-
parently successful.
Level-three participation was the greatest affront to United States
sovereignty. Boycotting states demanded that Americans refuse to trade
with other Americans pursuant to religious or economic boycott require-
ments. The law appears to have been effective in restraining this extra-
territorial reach of the boycotting countries. The Arab states, as all
nations, control who and what enters their territory. Preventing Ameri-
cans from complying with Arab controls imposed at Arab borders would
have meant a de facto boycott of the Arab states by the United States.
Instead, the law sought to confine within Arab borders the decision
whether to exercise those controls. The Arab states had sought to force
American firms to make boycott-based judgments about with whom they
were to to deal, effectively making them active participants in boycott
discrimination. Instead, the EAA permitted American firms to play only
a passive role. The law denied them the right to make boycott-related
judgments, but granted them the right to carry them out if made within
the boycotting state.
This approach recognized the sovereign prerogatives of each Arab
state to control access to its territory, but protected the United States
sovereign prerogatives to prevent its residents and nationals from imple-
menting a foreign policy disagreeable to other United States residents or
nationals. It appears to have been a workable compromise. Unfortu-
nately, much like the information available about refusals to deal with
Israel, the available data does not provide an adequate base to draw firm
conclusions.
Commerce Department enforcement of the procedures permitting
382. See supra notes 237-58 and accompanying text.
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level-three discrimination is negligible. In the seven enforcement actions
for violations of the refusal to deal with blacklisted persons and of reli-
gious discrimination provisions, the procedure outlined by the relevant
exceptions could have been followed to accomplish legally the result
sought by the firms in an illegal manner.383 The persons involved, how-
ever, apparently made no effort to follow the exceptions, and there is no
other enforcement activity policing their use. While the reporting figures
partially support the assumption that the regulatory scheme forcing
level-three boycott participation into the new form is successful, they are
not conclusive.384
The United States antiboycott laws have substantially reduced the
effects of the Arab boycott on United States transactions. The success of
this effort and its extraterritorial scope, however, compel a further in-
quiry into the implications of the law for structuring economic and polit-
ical relations.
383. In the Northstar Brokerage and Albert E. Bowen cases the parties declined to use in-
surance companies that refused to certify their nonblacklist status. See supra notes 319-24 and
accompanying text. Such certification, ironically, is legal. See supra note 241. Under the
unilateral selection exception, 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c) (1985), either firm could have submitted a
list of insurance companies to the boycotting country customer, the customer could have se-
lected a nonblacklisted firm, and Northstar or Bowen could have arranged for the coverage
with the selected firm. The net effect is the same: a nonblacklisted firm is selected. By only
implementing the boycott-based decision, the American companies are operating within the
boundaries of the law. Similarly, in the Lockheed and Baylor College of Medicine and related
discrimination cases the parties could have selected employees. See supra notes 314-54 and
accompanying text. The employees could have applied for visas and work permits, and the
parties could have replaced any employee rejected by the boycotting country's immigration
authorities. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(e) (1985).
384. Reporting figures for fiscal year 1983, for example, indicate a total of 6,370 transac-
tions reported where boycott action requested was permissible due to one of the exceptions.
This figure is approximately 17% of the total number of transactions reported during the year.
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT 1983, supra note 276, at 88-89. Most common requests
made permissible by the exceptions, such as vessel and route restriction or permissible state-
ments of origin, are also exceptions to the reporting requirements. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a)(5)
(1985). Thus, requests for actions made permissible by the more substantive exceptions, such
as unilateral selection and compliance with local law, which are reportable, probably make up
a significant proportion of the 6,370 transactions. The author's personal experience supports
the evidence that boycotting countries and United States firms have altered their practices to
take advantage of these exceptions. (The author was responsible for supervising the Depart-
ment's advisory function on applications of the antiboycott regulations. This involved review-
ing many of the requests for advice and participating in the more complex discussions. The
Department answered 2,500 to 3,000 inquiries annually.) See, e.g., EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
REPORT 1983, supra note 276, at 85).
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E. United States Extraterritorial Applications: Boycott and
Antiboycott
The stand taken by the United States with regard to the extraterrito-
rial reach of the Arab boycott has invited inquiry into the extraterritorial
application of United States laws. Ironically, some questions have been
raised about the appropriateness of the jurisdiction of the EAA an-
tiboycott provisions themselves,385 although more questions have been
raised about boycotts conducted by the United States, particularly its
export controls.38 6
No one has questioned the legitimacy of the United States require-
ment that persons inside the United States are not to be compelled by
Arab state boycott laws to engage in certain kinds of boycott-related ac-
tivities antithetical to United States laws or policies. The application of
this requirement to persons in third countries, however, has become con-
troversial. Under the definitions of the EAA, a subsidiary of an Ameri-
can company located in the United Kingdom, for example, is subject to
the antiboycott laws with regard to its transactions involving goods or
services originating in the United States. In trading with a boycotting
country it also would be subject to that country's restrictions and, of
course, the laws of the United Kingdom. How are potential conflicts
between the boycotting states' demands and United States laws to be
resolved?
This presents an unusual three-way conflict of jurisdictional claims.
While the proposed revisions of the Restatement offer some guidance on
two-way conflicts under the traditional concept of foreign state compul-
sion,38 7 they do not consider a three-cornered dispute. The United King-
dom has argued that it is the United States antiboycott law that presents
the conflict in such a situation, since the United Kingdom does not pre-
vent participation in the Arab boycott. 38 Indeed, the United Kingdom
385. See supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
386. See infra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
387. REVISED RESTATEMENT DRAFTr, supra note 1, at § 436.
388. The United Kingdom could prohibit many aspects of participation in the Arab boy-
cott, if it chose to, by invoking the provisions of the same Protection of Trading Interests Act
that it has used or threatened to use against United States trade controls. For example, under
section 2 of the Act the Secretary of State may prohibit the furnishing of commercial informa-
tion to a foreign country "if it infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise
prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom .... 1980, ch. 11, § 2(2)(a). Arab
boycott demands for information from United Kingdom firms about their business dealings
with Israel or other U.K. firms would appear to fall into this category. However, no effort has
been made to use the Protection of Trading Interests Act against the demands of Arab boy-
cotting nations.
19871
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
government has considered and expressly rejected anti-Arab boycott leg-
islation.389 Under the reasonableness standard of the Draft Revised Re-
statement, the United States would be hard-pressed to argue for
application of its jurisdiction against United Kingdom acquiescence in
Arab state jurisdiction.390
By nonetheless insisting on enforcement of its antiboycott law in
that situation, the United States undermines the credibility of that law as
a blocking statute. Instead, the law becomes another assertion of United
States jurisdiction over its "United States persons" located abroad, essen-
tially an extraterritorial attack on the Arab states' economic boycott. A
reasonable argument has been presented that, to make the antiboycott
law effective, the definition of "United States persons" as qualified by the
limitation to engage in transactions in United States commerce, must in-
clude foreign subsidiaries.391
Foreign states, most notably the United Kingdom, did not perceive
this to be the definition of "United States persons. ' 392 Although the ju-
risdictional requirement of both "United States person" and United
States commerce is a rational, reasonably limited standard, it is consid-
ered by the United Kingdom and other nations to be additional evidence
of the United States' own disregard for traditional jurisdictional
concepts.
In 1965 the Johnson Administration argued against mandatory an-
tiboycott rules because of their inconsistency with the United States eco-
nomic boycott of Cuba.3 93 Since that time the scope and complexity of
United States political trade controls have grown, strong antiboycott
laws have been adopted, and the anticipated conflict has arisen. This
failure by the United States to observe the limits it has successfully im-
389. See Phillips, supra note 191, at 28-34. The United Kingdom government recently
announced, however, that it would no longer authenticate documents for Arab boycotting
countries containing boycott-related certification. See Britain Takes First Anti-Boycott Step,
BoYcoTr REPORT 3 (Mar. 1986).
390. See REVISED RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, at § 403. The United States could
assert a claim of jurisdiction based on its view of nationality ("United States person") and
territorial effects ("United States commerce"). See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
However, the United Kingdom assertion of jurisdiction, based on nationality (United King-
dom corporate charter), territoriality (United Kingdom location), and territorial effects
(United Kingdom transaction), coupled with an Arab boycotting country's territorial (destina-
tion of goods or services) and protective principle (conflict with Israel) arguments, would ap-
pear to predominate.
391. See SENATE EAA REPORT 1977, supra note 9, at 27.
392. See A. LOWE, supra note 198, at 149 (quoting British Government Note No. 266 of 18
November 1977).
393. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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posed on the Arab states has been duly noted by the United States' trad-
ing partners.
The most recent example of United States disregard for its own an-
tiboycott standards was the 1982 imposition of an embargo on all ship-
ments of equipment to the Soviet Union for construction of a natural gas
pipeline from Russia to Western Europe.394 The embargo was imposed
not only on American firms and subsidiaries, but on European firms that
had licensed technology from American firms. The European firms were
required to refrain from providing United States licensed technology to
the Soviet Union, or lose their trading privileges with the United States,
that is, be blacklisted. This is a form of level-four boycott participation
and secondary boycott participation. In a strongly worded protest
against this action, the European Economic Community argued that the
United States demand to cease dealing with the Soviet Union was the
kind of demand United States firms were prohibited from complying
with under the antiboycott provisions of the EAA.395 This argument was
correct.396 The ban on refusals to deal in the EAA antiboycott provi-
sions 39 7 would prevent American firms from taking the kind of action
394. For two accounts of this episode, see Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments
of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 L. &
POL. INT'L Bus. 1, 69-73 (1983); and A. LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at 267-94.
395. If a foreign country were to take measures like the June 22 Amendments, it is
doubtful whether they would be in conformity with United States law and they
would therefore probably not be recognized and enforced by the United States
courts. The kind of mobilization of European Community companies for United
States purposes to which the Community objects was subject to strong American
reactions and legislative countermeasures, when United States companies were simi-
larly mobilized for the foreign policy purposes of other States. The antiforeign-boy-
cott provisions of Section 8 of the Export Administration Act are testimony to that.
In the same way as the United States could not accept that its companies were turned
into instruments of the foreign policy of other nations, the European Community
cannot accept that its companies must follow another trade policy than its own
within its own territorial jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that the antiboycott provi-
sions of the Export Administration Act can be invoked in response to a boycott that
takes a less direct form than the June 22 Amendments, namely a boycott which
merely tries to dissuade persons from dealing with a third country by refusing to
trade with such persons. An export restriction patterned on the June 22 Amend-
ments, in contrast, would directly prohibit a person from dealing with a particular
country under the threat of government-imposed penalties. Therefore, the latest
Amendments would appear to be even more far-reaching than a boycott which might
give rise to the application of the antiboycott provision.
Note and Comments of the European Community, 12 Aug. 1982, para. 15, reprinted in A.
LOWE, supra note 198, at 205-06.
396. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 395, at 113-14 (the authors parallel the European
reaction to the United States pipeline embargo and United States antiboycott laws adopted in
reaction to the Arab boycott of Israel).
397. "No United States person may refuse to do business with or in a boycotted country
19871
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
that the United States was asking the European firms to take. While the
United States ultimately retreated from its demands on the European
firms, the point was made. What was sauce for the goose was definitely
not sauce for the gander.3 98
F. Conclusion
Have the antiboycott laws worked? Are they a success? At this
point it is possible to answer both questions with a very qualified "yes."
The laws have substantially reduced the role of Americans at the
first three levels of participation in the Arab boycott, and have at least
provided a warning about participation at the fourth level. They success-
fully limited the extraterritorial reach of the Arab states without sacrific-
ing trade relations with those states.
The laws have probably not reduced the impact of the boycott on
Israel however, nor enhanced the trade opportunities of American firms
blacklisted for their dealings with Israel. The price of continued trade
has been the continued ability of American firms to refuse to trade with
these blacklisted firms, and to refuse to employ Jews in projects in the
Arab states, so long as proper procedures are followed. This is part of
the balance that has been struck.
The qualified success of the antiboycott laws must also be balanced
with the broader issue raised by United States limitations on political
trade controls of Arab states. The United States refusal to abide by the
extraterritorial limitations it wishes to apply to others, combined with
the effort to apply antiboycott rules themselves extraterritorially, neces-
sarily dilutes the persuasiveness of the antiboycott effort and reduces the
chances for international cooperation in dealing with the Arab boycott.
... when such refusal is pursuant to ... a requirement of the boycotting country .. " 15
C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(1) (1985). Because the United States controls were being exercised on tech-
nology rather than goods, the exception that permits a third country firm to refrain from
shipping goods from the boycotting country to the boycotted country would not apply. See 15
C.F.R. § 369.3(d) (1985).
398. Professor Lowenfeld employed this apt metaphor in 1977 when he suggested that the
United States might have to be willing to give up its own secondary boycotts to obtain interna-
tional cooperation to deal with the Arab League's secondary boycott. Lowenfeld, supra note
115, at 39; but see Steiner, International Boycotts, supra note 6, at 1395-97 (distinguishing
United States export controls from the secondary aspect of the Arab boycott). In another
inconsistent application of its prerogatives the United States is reportedly considering a re-
quirement that foreign suppliers of petroleum products certify that the products were not re-
fined from Libyan crude oil. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, May 19, 1986, at 8, col. 2. This
requirement, if adopted, would be inconsistent with the antiboycott law's ban on United States
firms providing negative certificates of origin to foreign boycotting nations. 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(b) (1985).
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Moreover, it causes almost any action by the United States to define ex-
traterritorial authority to be perceived as an act of political expediency.
While the antiboycott laws may have been a response to a particular do-
mestic and international political situation, they define a set of standards
for limiting foreign influence. The United States can ignore these stan-
dards in defining the boundaries of its own influence, but only at substan-
tial risk to its own credibility.

